SOVIET FAR EAST
And PACIFIC NORTHWEST

Edited by
ROBERT MOSSÉ
Special Research Professor of Economics and Business, University of Washington

SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES . . .
Bureau of Business Research ● College of Economics and Business

Seattle . . . 1944
University of Washington Press

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University of Washington Press
Seattle, Washington
1944

Published in complete conformity
with the regulations of the War Production Board

Printed in United States of America

FOREWORD

A glance at one of the currently popular maps of the top of the world reveals the geographic proximity which has stimulated the interest of citizens of the Pacific Northwest in Siberia. Separated only by a narrow strait, Alaska's Cape Prince of Wales looks west to Siberia's East Cape. Siberia is as close to Seattle, Tacoma, or Spokane as is New York. Indeed, in less than a day, the city of Petropavlovsk (Kamchatka) can be reached by plane from Washington State airports.

American interest in Siberia has not been restricted to wistful globe-gazing. On the contrary, the active pursuit of air routes by the air lines of the United States has focused attention on commercial transportation regions. The vast acceleration of aviation during the war insures that airplanes will be in actual operation between northwestern points in the United States and northeastern points in Siberia very soon after the war.

Ocean shipping, moreover, has not failed to note the advantages of the short route between the two nations. Shrouded in secrecy as has been the war traffic between Russia and the United States, it is nevertheless well known to individuals of both countries that trade routes have been established and merchandise has flowed over the top of the earth in both directions as a part of the lend-lease program of the United Nations. Dwellers in seaports, like Seattle, have met the sailors from Russian craft on their streets and in their stores, and many Russians have thus had the opportunity to discover the Pacific Northwest. Unfortunately, Americans have had little or no opportunity to learn by similar first-hand contact of the cities and people of Russia's far eastern reaches. Russo-Japanese neutrality has permitted Russian ships to sail the Pacific unmolested, whereas United States shipping has been more restricted. Russian bottoms have had to carry the traffic both ways.

Herein lies another reason for the interest of Pacific Northwesterners in Siberia. Curiosity has been piqued by war-time contacts which could not be followed through. Businessmen have wondered if some of the goods moving in war-time trade will continue to flow after the war. "What has Russia that we need, and what have we that Russia needs?" they query. "What developments are moving apace in Siberia? Does the industrialization of Siberia not offer possibilities for lucrative trade between the two peoples? What resources have been uncovered or developed that portend hope for increased production and rising standards of living in Russia and the Far East?"

The prospects for two-way tourist traffic after the war appear substantial. Many of the Russians will, no doubt, be eager to visit our shores, and many Americans eagerly await their first opportunity to fly over the air routes which lead northward to Russia's new world.

The unknown always intrigues, mystery always beckons. While distance has been a barrier in the past, a greater barrier, perhaps, has been the ignorance born of language differences. As the world shrinks, ways must be found to overcome this handicap. Certainly, if trade and commerce are to flourish between Siberia and the Pacific Northwest as greatly as their fortuitous geographic positions indicate, each people must learn something of the other's tongue.

Meanwhile, it is the purpose of this little brochure to bring to Americans some ideas, not as widely known as they should be, about their great ally. A prologue to the study of Russia's great eastern frontier, this pamphlet is designed to highlight selected economic and cultural developments which have mushroomed under our very noses. If these papers intrigue the interest in, and stimluate further study of, our neighbors to the far north, they will have served their purpose. For those who desire to read further, a list of selected readings is included.

This is the first volume in the Special Studies Series of the Bureau of Business Research; the series was authorized by the General Publications Board of the University in 1943 to permit the publication of material which is not specifically of a research character but which may be of general interest. The Bureau of Business Research, a division of the College of Economics and Business, interests itself particularly in the business problems of the Pacific Northwest and plans to issue similar reports from time to time.

NATHANAEL H. ENGLE,
Professor of Economics and Business,
Director of the Bureau of Business Research

PREFACE

This is a publication of the Russian Economic Research Project, which was established at the University of Washington in 1943 with the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation. Herein is presented useful information and authoritative opinion on some phases of Soviet life and culture, with particular emphasis on such matters as will be of interest to the general public in the Pacific Northwest. It is hoped that this volume will contribute to a better understanding of our great neighbor.

The editor wishes to acknowledge here the generous support given to him, in the preparation of this material, by the Rockefeller Foundation and the University of Washington. Especial thanks are due to Dr. Howard H. Preston, Dean of the College of Economics and Business, and Dr. Nathanael H. Engle, Director of the Bureau of Business Research, who were instrumental in arranging for the publication of the material; and to Mr. Bradford H. Smith, Draftsman for the Department of Sociology, who prepared the maps. This opportunity is also taken to express to the collaborators full appreciation of their help in this undertaking.

While assuming no responsibility for the views expressed by the various contributors, the editor is responsible for the selection of authors and topics, and for the general lay-out of the volume.

ROBERT MOSSÉ

Seattle
January, 1944

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

NEW BRIDGES TO ASIA

By Franz H. Michael, *Associate Professor and Acting Executive Officer of the Far Eastern Department, University of Washington*

The full importance of the developments across the Pacific has been brought home to us through the war. There have been many new lessons and a great many surprises. The strength of China in her struggle against Japan has made us recognize her as one of the four big powers of the allied nations. Russia has not only broken and defeated the Nazi onslaught, but is still surprising us with her unknown reserves of energy. We have also learned to revaluate the strength of our enemy, Japan, and we have begun to look to friends and enemies in Asia with a new realization of the fact that our continent opens upon two oceans, and that the Asiatic world is as important to us for the war and for the peace as Europe has ever been.

But not only has the realization of the overwhelming importance of Russia and the emergence of China and the strength of our enemy, Japan, made us turn westward to what is called the Far East; war has taught us new geography, has forced us to count every mile of distance, to overcome obstacles of nature and climate and ignorance to bring help to our friends and attack upon our enemies. Russia, we discovered, for practical reality, is our neighbor separated from us by a few miles of water. When Wendell Willkie on his global trip left Chungking, in China, on a Saturday, he arrived on a Monday at the airfield in Fairbanks. With the attack on the Aleutians, the Japanese threatened Alaska and brought home the possibility of an air attack on American industrial centers; from our reconquered bases, we have begun to attack Paramushiro on the northern end of the Kurile Islands which stretch down to the Japanese main islands.

One has only to look at the globe to see how much nearer the road is from the west coast to the Far East via what has been called the great circle route. From San Francisco to Hawaii to Midway to Wake to Tokyo is a distance of 6,920 statute miles; from Seattle via Dutch Harbor the distance is only 4,800 miles. All the distances to China, Japan, far eastern Russia, even to European Russia, shrink considerably when the trip is taken over or near the top of the world. The credit goes to the Russians for first pioneering and developing weather stations and explorations for arctic flying and shipping. We have followed in their path, and because of the war we have made giant strides in developing our northern lines of communication, lines that will open up a new period of cooperation in the peace to come. As our Aleutian campaign has turned from the defensive to the offensive, so our newly built roads and airfields and anchorages, and maybe railroads, will be the technical means for linking us up in a new, shorter way with the world in Russia and in Asia with which we shall have to cooperate.

The development of the northwest has brought with it many ideas of such new communication lines in the air, on the water, and on land, and yet these ideas are not entirely novel. There have been many precedents, half-forgotten, of earlier attempts to link America with Asia over the northern route. In 1864 before Alaska was bought by the United States, steps were taken for a telegraph line to Europe via Fairbanks and Siberia. When all attempts to lay the trans-Atlantic cable seemed to have failed, the telegraph company, Western Union, turned to the other side of the world. The telegraph of 1864 had gone far into the wilderness of Alaska when renewed attempts to lay the trans-Atlantic cable eventually stopped the work. Even today there is wire hidden under Alaskan moss and many a fence in Alaska is built from telegraph copper wire. But after this attempt the newly gained American territory outposts in Alaska were ignored again, were left outside of the course of world events, and only occasionally were brought into the plans and ideas of those who foresaw the possibilities of linking America and Asia in this shortest way. In 1890, Czar Alexander suggested that his Siberian railway, then under construction, should be

linked with an American system through Alaska. Such a plan could not be understood in a time that had not yet conquered the north. So fared the plans about ten years later of the American railway king, E. H. Harriman, who dreamt of a railway around the world. After developing the Pacific railway systems, which he controlled, Harriman saw the possibilities of developing a Canadian-Alaskan system, to be linked with the projected Russian railroad possibly by the fantastic plan of a bridge or tunnel across the Bering Strait. According to the engineer, J. A. L. Waddell, the Japanese secured from the Russians in the peace negotiations after the war in 1905 a verbal agreement not to follow up such plans, but Harriman was not easily discouraged. He went to Tokyo to offer American assistance in rebuilding and organizing the south Manchurian railway as a link in his plans. When the Japanese broke the agreement they had made with him, he set out to buy Russian interests first. And he might eventually have succeeded, had not his death in 1909 ended all the plans. The outcome was the Knox neutralization plan for the Manchurian railways, which ended in failure and created a Russo-Japanese cooperation in Manchuria, instead of the larger American-Russian link envisaged by Harriman. It took a war to bring Russia and America together to the north of Japan.

But in the meantime, technical progress had gone farther. The Russian Five-Year Plans had not only begun the development of Siberia, but had opened the mouths of their rivers and linked them with the Atlantic and the Pacific by the arctic northeast passage. From the east cape to Archangel and Murmansk, ice reconnoitering planes and ice-breakers kept open the shipping lanes that carried dozens of freighters during the summer seasons from the Siberian harbors to the oceans of the world. The Russian arctic explorations and especially their arctic flying opened the way for other connections. In the meantime, the idea of an Alaskan road was taken up by the stubborn Alaskan engineer, Donald MacDonald, who for more than fifteen years fought a one-man war for a road which should link Seattle with Fairbanks over a line traveled and mapped by him. MacDonald fought for the development of Alaska with its great possibilities, but he did not forget the larger place of his home territory as a link in world communications. In 1928 he approached the Russians for the first time, asking them whether they would consider building a road to Bering Strait to be linked with his road from Nome, via Fairbanks, to Seattle, with the 30-mile gap of the Bering Strait linked by ship or air. In 1931 the Russian U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce for Western Trade wrote to MacDonald that his project raised great interest among Russian organizations, but that unfortunately the project was not a practical one for the nearest future. Nor was it practical for the United States as yet. But even before such Russian-American plans emerged from the realm of dreams of individual engineers, Russian and American pilots in the north became friendly cooperators in time of need.

Now the war has realized some of those dreams. Few Americans are yet aware of the great achievements of air transportation that are opening up new short routes over the top of the world. This time the accomplishments of the war are bound to remain, and with all limitations of our knowledge of what military preparations have accomplished, we can see the routes that our future traffic with the east will take. There are, first, the airways of the North Pacific great circle route. There are also the routes that lead from Seattle-Vancouver or Chicago-New York to Fairbanks, to Nome, over the Bering Strait to Anadyr in Siberia, and from there farther west and south. Where today the Russians pick up our bombers in Fairbanks to fly them to Russia, there will in the future be a great passenger airport to Russia, to China, and the whole Far East. There is the other possibility, more important still, of an air link into the other Alaskan arm, the Aleutian chain, via Dutch Harbor and on to Kamchatka, Vladivostok, and Japan. There is the possibility of polar routes to Moscow and European countries. We know much less of the Russian air fields, veiled by military secrecy at present, than we know of the details of our air development in the Pacific Northwest, but the technical experiences on both sides during this war should clear the way for an arrangement of future transportation lines. It is a matter of public information that the Russians have large fields down the Siberian coast from the east cape around the sea of Okhotsk to Vladivostok, and when in 1940 the Pan-American Airways started their regular air route from Seattle to Alaska, they envisaged even then a commercial route into Asia. When in 1941 two

big Soviet flying boats arrived in Seattle with Soviet flyers on a secret military mission, our shortest connection with Russia was shown beyond doubt, and Willkie's trip indicated that it was also the shortest route to China.

Then there are the roads: MacDonald's plan of 1928 has not yet come true, but in the meantime a similar road has been built, the Alcan road, linking Edmonton to Fairbanks. This road can be built on to Nome, can be linked with other roads, and may eventually connect, with or without a Bering Strait tunnel, with Russian roads to Yakutsk and to European Russia. Thus would be fulfilled the dream of the motorist that he might travel in his own car from the highways of the United States to the Champs Elysées.

There are also plans for railroad building. A proposed Canadian-Alaskan railroad is to link Prince George, and thus Vancouver and Seattle, with Fairbanks. A road and a railroad together may thus create the overland connection of which Harriman dreamt.

New shipping lines may be expected in the future, not only to connect the Alaskan coast with North American ports, but also to link our ports, via the Bering Strait, with the Russian northeast passage. From Seattle to Archangel via this sea route is only 1,500 miles longer than via Vladivostok. This northern transportation route which was first opened in 1934 by the Russians has been most useful during the war and will doubtless remain important in the future. But shipping to Kamchatka, to Nikolaevsk, Sovetskaya Gavan, Vladivostok, and the ports of Japan and of China will also be much nearer on this northern route and will increase in volume and importance with the development of the Russian Far East.

These communication lines of the future, on the land, in the air, and on the water, depend, however, on the development of the regions through which the routes pass. The Russians gave evidence of what we may expect from them by their pre-war activity, not only in the development of weather stations and research, but also in the industrial development of Siberia and the Far East, even to such regions as Yakutsk. The potentialities for the development of the Pacific Northwest are now being intensively explored. Plans for Alaska's agricultural and industrial development will, no doubt, have to be supplemented by plans for a local machine-tool industry in the state of Washington. The Alcan highway, though not leading through the most important region of development, has been the opening wedge, and more communications will bring a certain progress which will make the northwest of America into the balanced economic region it can become.

But all this development is only possible on the basis of international cooperation. The Alcan highway itself was a good example of the result of such cooperation. The United States and Canada, with their traditional history of friendship, did not have much difficulty in attaining such cooperation. In our common northwest the odd lines of the border made cooperation essential for any economic development. The halibut fisheries convention in 1923 and the salmon convention in 1937 were examples of such cooperation; but the most important organization is the joint economic committee of Canada and the United States, which is sponsoring plans and studies for the development of the northwest. All the industrial, agricultural, and communication projects will have to be worked out in common with and be promoted by this committee.

If we thus succeed in creating a healthy northwest as a preliminary to our relations with Asia, we shall have to find the same kind of cooperation with Russia, with China, and with the other countries in the Far East. Communications, traffic, and exchange of goods can only be accomplished on the basis of common purpose and common policies. The technical bridges of communications between Asia and America have to be preceded by bridges of friendship and understanding. There is no reason why such friendship and cooperation as has been created between the United States and Russia during the war should not be carried over into the future peace.

For Lin Yu-tang in his *Between Tears and Laughter* the emergence of Soviet Russia and China as great powers is the most important event of the war. We will have to count with these powers and will have to work with them. In the case of Russia that will mean overlooking the principles on which we are not agreed and building on those where we are on common ground. The war has shown that there is enough to build on. Russian industrial development, Russian venturing into new fields of science, Russian pioneering is similar enough

to our own to give a basis for profitable co-operation. It has not been difficult to recognize Russia's strength and her position as a partner of the future. The case of China is more complicated. China is only emerging from a status of inequality, of economic exploitation secured by treaties; she has still not quite found her own final form out of the transformation of the revolution. But she is very determined to fight and stand for the principles that have made her free—the principles of self-determination and of emancipation from any form of colonial or semi-colonial control. China will need our help but she will take it only on her own terms, on terms of equality. China is watchful not only of our attitude towards her but of our whole policy toward the question of emancipation. The road that leads from Fairbanks or Dutch Harbor to Chungking will lead straight on via Burma to Assam, India, and the Near East. It is most likely that this will be the future air or land connection from the Americas to the Middle East. But how open this road will be will depend more on our political program and that of our allies than on technicalities. Today China is, ideologically, at least as near to us as she is to Russia. We must build on our community of ideas and the traditions of our relations which have been good, rather than permit the United Nations to fall apart into Anglo-Saxon and Asiatic blocks and let the line of demarcation cut the bridges in the north.

We have made a good beginning. The Moscow Four- and Three-Power Agreements, the Cairo and Teheran Declarations have been a first realization of the goal of the United Nations. But many issues remain. We have not yet worked out the organization of the future order in the Pacific as we want to see it. We have not yet established any principles in the line of the Atlantic Charter that would be more of a program for the Far East than the settlement of the boundary questions as undertaken so far. The United States policy in the Far East has had a great tradition of live and let live, of granting independence and integrity. We should be able to be the active mediator between the forces of a colonial world of the past and the rising national demands in eastern Asia. Our future relations with Russia and the Far East will, not only in the economic field but also politically, demand a give and take attitude and an exchange among equals. Russia, China, Southeastern Asia, India—all these countries have the greatest economic possibilities for our generation. A solid political basis is necessary. With imagination and good will this basis can be reached. The war has shown that we should not only look back to Europe and the past, we should look ahead to Asia and the future.

ECONOMICS OF THE SOVIET FAR EAST[1]

By Robert Mossé, *Special Research Professor of Economics and Business, University of Washington, and Professeur Agrégé des Facultés de Droit, University of Grenoble*

I. Siberia

Just as the United States of America, beyond the densely populated and highly industrialized Atlantic area, has an immense hinterland offering boundless opportunities, Russia possesses beyond the Urals a huge empire extending to the Pacific Coast. Siberia offers probably more natural resources, including a variety of minerals, than the United States. However, the Russian frontier differs in many ways from the American frontier.

First, the Siberian area is twice as large as the whole territory of the United States.[2] From Moscow to the Pacific seaboard is some 6,000 miles, or nearly twice the American coast-to-coast distance. The amount of cultivable land, however, is significantly smaller than in the United States under present technical conditions.

Secondly, the climate is everywhere extremely severe, particularly in the northern parts. Practically, there are not many opportunities beyond the 60° parallel; a good half of Siberia is inimical to human life and permanent settlements.

Thirdly, compared with the United States, Siberia is in many respects one or two centuries behind the times. Except for the Trans-Siberian Railroad and air transport, transportation, for instance, is still as it was in the United States at the time of the Declaration of Independence.

In spite of some adverse natural circumstances, the Russians have for a long time been aware of the tremendous possibilities of Siberia and have tried to take advantage of them, especially since the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). The Czarist government attempted to induce colonization through loans, concessions of land, and exemption from taxes. It is estimated that between 1905 and 1913 at least three million colonists have settled in Siberia.[3] But the really great eastward push began under the Soviet government, as a systematically organized migration, settlement, and industrialization, within the framework of the successsive Five-Year Plans.[4] The economic and cultural development of Siberia was deliberately planned as one of the main goals of the Soviet economic policy. The present World War has hastened the tempo so that upon the morrow of victory Siberia may be economically as important as the European part of the Soviet Union.

Siberia, like Gaul, may be divided into three parts: western Siberia, from the Urals to the meridian of Novosibirsk; central Siberia, extending eastward to Lake Baikal; far eastern Siberia, stretching to the Pacific Coast. It is with this latter that we are more especially interested because it is the region of the Soviet Union that can be reached most easily from the American west coast. Although it is not precluded that the Pacific Northwest may and will supply goods and services to and receive them from central and even western Siberia, geography rules that the Soviet Far East is the more natural neighbor for the purposes of trade.

II. The Soviet Far East

The phrase "Soviet Far East" may be understood in several ways. Not long ago the Far Eastern Territory[5] was, in the Soviet administrative organization, a stretch of land along the Pacific seaboard, dipping no more

[1] Main sources of information on the Soviet Far East are: Nicholas Mikhailov, *Land of the Soviets,* Lee Furman, New York, 1939; William Mandel, *Soviet Far East,* Institute of Pacific Relations (mimeo.), Dec., 1942; E. Raikhman and B. Vedensky, *The Economic Development of the Soviet Far East,* U.S.S.R. Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Mos- *Soviet Far East,* U.S.S.R. Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Moscow, 1936.

[2] The total area of Siberia is 5,900,000 square miles (Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1939, p. 122) and the continental area of the United States is 3,000,000 square miles.

[3] Fridtjof Nansen, *Through Siberia, the Land of the Future,* English translation, London, 1914, p. 285.

[4] First Five-Year Plan, 1928-1932; second Five-Year Plan, 1933-1937; third Five-Year Plan, 1938-1942.

[5] Dalnie vostochnii Krai.

than five hundred miles inland. Differing from this now obsolete terminology, "Soviet Far East" is construed here as including all territories from Lake Baikal and the Lena River basin to the Pacific Ocean, and from the southern border of the Soviet Union up to the Arctic Ocean.[6]

Due to the long and terrible Siberian winter, only the part of this area located approximately south of the 55° parallel, from Lake Baikal to Nikolaevsk and Vladivostok, may be considered as offering reasonable opportunities for development, with a normal food supply provided for by local agriculture. This area, of which the length is about 1,500 miles and the width 300 miles, has now the first prerequisite of economic development: a double-track railroad line.

Khabarovsk, with the same latitude as Seattle, Washington, is one of the most hospitable places of the region, the average January temperature being 7° Fahrenheit below zero (–22° Centigrade). Farther inland it is between –16° F. and –32° F.[7] Furthermore, the winter is long; in the lower reaches of the Amur River, between Khabarovsk and Nikolaevsk, navigation is possible only for six months, the river being icebound half the year.

The northern part of the Soviet Far East, from the Lena River to the Bering Strait, and from the Aldan Plateau to the Arctic Ocean, is and will be for a long time a wilderness. Verkhoiansk, in this area, is called the pole of frigidity, the coldest place on the earth, with an average January temperature of –48° F. and the rivers icebound for 240 days a year. It is not likely that this region will ever become a great center of colonization; its population is to be counted in tens of thousands. However, it has important natural resources. Timber, furs, and gold have been known and exported for a long time. They have been attractive enough to offset the drawbacks of the climate and lack of communications. More recently, geological expeditions have discovered important deposits of coal, iron ore, tin, zinc, nickel, platinum, etc. Such mineral resources will justify the settling of scattered industrial centers. Mankind in general and the Russians in particular have, in the past decades, made much progress on the road to mastering cold. It is a fact that the limit of agriculture has been pushed northward by as much as 5°. Aviation helps to solve the communication problem, as planes can bring supplies anywhere at any time. Hydroelectric power can generate heat and comfort. Considering these facts, it would be inaccurate to say that the northern part of the Soviet Far East has no future. It is only true that its future is limited by climatic conditions.

III. Main Administrative Divisions

From the administrative standpoint, the Soviet Far East is part of the largest Republic of the Soviet federation, i.e., the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republics (usually referred to as R.S.F.S.R.), which is itself a federation.[8]

In the Far East are three autonomous republics or regions:

(1) *The Buriat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic,* which is a crescent-shaped mountainous territory located east and south of Lake Baikal, has a population of about half a million and an area of 128,000 square miles. Not long ago the Buriat-Mongols were illiterate, primitive nomads living in felt tents. Most of them are now settled on collective farms. Buriat-Mongolia has become an important cattle-raising center and is being industrialized at a rapid pace. The capital of the Republic, Ulan Ude (130,000 inhabitants), has, among other industries, locomotive and carriage works.[9] Vast tungsten deposits south of Lake Baikal will contribute to the development of the Buriat-Mongol A.S.S.R.

(2) *The Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic* has a sparse population of 400,000 in an area equivalent to one-third of the United States. Of Turkish descent, the Yakuts were gradually pushed north by other peoples and were obliged to settle in the Lena River Basin, a forest-covered territory of which the main resource is hunting. Yakutsk (50,000 in-

[6] In a paper prepared for the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Soviet representatives defined the Soviet Far East as extending from 100 to 190 degrees east of Greenwich, and from 42 to 72 degrees latitude north.

[7] As a basis for comparison, in Minneapolis, one of the coldest cities of the United States, the average January temperature is +13° Fahrenheit.

[8] The R.S.F.S.R., with an area of 6 million square miles, covers 78 per cent of the territory of the Soviet Union. Its population of 100 million people constitutes more than half of the total population of the U.S.S.R.

[9] According to the second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937) the capacity was 12,000 freight cars and 2,000 passenger cars.

habitants), the capital of the Republic, can now be reached by driving on a seven-hundred mile road, running north from Rukhlovo, a station of the Amur Railroad, through the Aldan gold fields. It can also be reached from Irkutsk when the Lena River is not frozen. In recent years collective farms have been organized and about 250,000 acres are producing spring rye, wheat, barley, and vegetables; cattle-raising is developing and improving. Abundant and varied mineral resources, recently surveyed, make this region somewhat attractive in spite of the climate. Besides gold, mined on a large scale, and tin, refined on the spot, the reserves of coal are estimated at 50 billion tons. Iron ore can be mined by open-cut operations. Furthermore, it is reported that oil has been found wherever it has been drilled for in a line running for a thousand miles. There are also zinc, nickel, platinum, and many other minerals.

(3) *The Jewish Autonomous Region,* located between the railroad and the Amur River, southwest of Khabarovsk, has a population of some 100,000 on a relatively small but fertile area. This region, often named after its capital Birobidzhan, was offered for voluntary Jewish settlement, in order to give an outlet to the dense Jewish population of western Russia. It is devoted mainly to a diversified agriculture, including vegetable and fruit growing, but as one author points out, "There is no agrarian one-sidedness. The skillful hands of the one-time artisans who have now become workers have laid the foundations of Far Eastern light industry."

Besides these three autonomous areas, the Soviet Far East, as understood here, includes the following sections:

(4) *The Irkutsk Oblast,* west and north of Lake Baikal, is the westernmost fringe of the Soviet Far East and is sometimes not considered as belonging to the Far East. Irkutsk is a big city of nearly 250,000 inhabitants and the whole oblast contains about 1,300,000 people. The Irkutsk region is a prosperous agricultural region, but the possession of coal and iron-ore deposits paves the way for industrial developments. By 1938, an area of 1,839,000 acres was sown, of which 1,635,000 acres were in grain. During the second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937) considerable industrial development took place. Projects costing over one million rubles each were: railroad-car-building works, lumber and furniture factories, a meat-packing plant, and a soap factory, to mention only a few.

(5) Farther east, is the *Chita Oblast,* a relatively poor, mountainous, wooded steppe, with some parts favorable to agriculture. A population of roughly 1,200,000 lives mainly on cattle raising in the south and on fur hunting and gold mining in the north. Chita, formerly a place of banishment, has now a population of over 100,000. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the trading post and last military outpost on the road to Manchuria (Manchukuo).

(6) East of the Chita Oblast begins the immense *Khabarovsk Territory,* which stretches from a west-east line marked by Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, and Sovetskaya Gavan (on the Tatar Strait), northwards to the Bering Strait. Its eastern limit is a 9,000-mile water front along the Pacific Ocean, while its northern border is the Arctic Ocean from Cape Dezhneva to the north of the Kolyma River. The total population is estimated at 1,500,000. The most populated and developed area is, of course, the Amur Valley from Blagoveshchensk (58,000 inhabitants) to Khabarovsk (200,000 inhabitants), Komsomolsk (70,000 inhabitants), and Nikolaevsk. The Khabarovsk Territory also controls several other regions such as the Soviet half of *Sakhalin Island,* which is well endowed with oil and coal; the northern *coast of the Sea of Okhotsk,* which is rapidly developing as a springboard to the north; the *Kamchatka Peninsula,* whose relatively mild climate promises a bright future. Of all the Soviet Far East, the lower valley of the Amur offers the most immediate opportunities, but it would be a mistake to focus too much attention upon it and to overlook other parts.

(7) Finally, the *Maritime Territory,* though a small area, with a population of nearly one million, is extremely important because: (a) it enjoys the best climate of the whole Far East, being the southernmost part and under maritime influences; (b) its center is Vladivostok, the main seaport of the Soviet Union on the Pacific Ocean; (c) it is a thin strip of land practically surrounded by Japan. The inland area, extending along the Ussuri River, west of the Sikhota Alin Range, is the best suited for agriculture. The Maritime Territory was industrialized to some extent in the

pre-Revolution days but its growth, although not negligible, has not been as spectacular as in the other regions. Furthermore, it is very vulnerable to external attacks. Vladivostok is only 600 miles from Tokyo. In the future, when the Japanese menace is thwarted, one of the major obstacles to the development of this area will be removed.

IV. Natural Resources

The natural resources of the Soviet Far East have, so far, been very incompletely investigated. In spite of the remarkable job carried out by various Soviet scientific expeditions, large portions of the territory have still to be surveyed. Yet, on the basis of existing data, it may be said that the Soviet Far East possesses not only rare minerals which are a significant asset in foreign trade, but also the basic natural resources indispensable to the development of a modern economy, such as coal, iron ore, oil, and hydroelectric power.

Coal. Almost all the regions of the Far East have coal deposits, with a great variety of types. In the Yakut Republic more than one hundred different occurrences of coal have been discovered, with reserves estimated at 50 billion tons.[10] Even richer are the coal fields of Cheremkhovo, near the city of Irkutsk, whose reserves are estimated at 100 billion tons. In the southern part of the Khabarovsk Krai, on the Bureya River, some 200 miles west of Komsomolsk, deposits of about 10 to 15 billion tons have been surveyed. Besides that, the Khabarovsk Krai possesses coal deposits in Sakhalin Island and in the Kamchatka Peninsula. Near Vladivostok, the so-called Suchan Basin may have up to 12 billion tons. Apart from these main deposits, coal is to be found in many other localities. An interesting fact to remember is that "the entire scale of coals is represented, from lignites to anthracites and from humus coals to bituminous shales."[11]

Iron ore. Thanks to intensive prospecting, carried out mainly in the nineteen thirties, the Soviet Far East has been recognized as being reasonably supplied with iron ore. Various iron-ore beds are located along the Trans-Siberian Railroad and between the railroad and the Amur, near Irkutsk, near Ulan Ude, east of Chita, in the Birobidzhan region, and in the vicinity of Vladivostok. Near Yakutsk there are iron-ore deposits which can be wholly mined by open-cut operations. The region may have several hundred million tons of iron ore,[12] so far discovered and surveyed. The quality of this ore, however, is not always good, the iron content ranging from as low as 31 per cent up to 60 per cent in the best deposits. Impurities, also, are sometimes found in the ores to a serious degree. However, there is probably enough iron ore to supply Far Eastern industry and it is very likely that in the future other beds will be discovered and investigated. A Soviet scientific committee reported, "Besides the enumerated beds and districts, there are at many points in the Far East uninvestigated surface indications of iron ore."

Oil. In the Far East the chief and best known oil reserves are located in Sakhalin Island. Half of a total output of some 700,000 tons, in 1938, was obtained in Soviet-controlled wells; the other half was obtained by Japanese concessions in the Soviet territory. The Soviet-produced oil is refined partly on the spot and partly at Khabarovsk. More recently, oil fields were surveyed in Kamchatka and in the Irkutsk Republic. Moreover, plans and appropriations have been made for the construction of a synthetic plant, using Cheremkhovo coal, near Irkutsk.

Hydroelectric power. Almost all parts of the Far East are well endowed with water-power potentialities. Difficult problems, however, arise because streams are frozen for several months each year, although such obstacles are not insuperable in modern times. In the Irkutsk Oblast alone potential water power is estimated at twenty million kilowatts. In the Maritime Region and in the south of the Khabarovsk Krai, the Ussuri and the Amur rivers might be harnessed and become a source of cheap and abundant electric energy. In this field very little has been done so far, but important developments are ahead. The know-how acquired in the United States, especially with the Tennessee Valley and with the Columbia River developments, should be of great usefulness for the Soviet Far East. American machinery, generators, and trans-

[10] On the basis of the United States' output in 1940 (400 million metric tons), the Yakut Republic could supply the United States for one hundred years.

[11] *Nature and Natural Resources,* p. 8. In this report, many data about composition, calorific value, geologic formation, etc., of various deposits are given.

[12] In 1940 the U. S. output of iron ore was 75 million tons.

mission facilities may certainly find an outlet in the Soviet Far East. In the early thirties, Americans helped to build the Dnieprostroi; after victory, they may help to build an Amurstroi, an Ussuristroi, a Lenastroi, and so forth.

Other mineral resources. Whereas coal, iron ore, oil, and water power provide a basis for the development of regional industries, other mineral resources supply the Soviet Far East with a purchasing power on foreign markets. *Gold,* of course, has been for a long time past[13] the chief source of purchasing power of Siberia, which possesses most of the Russian gold fields and produces the bulk of the total Soviet output. Except for some deposits in the Kuznetsk basin, almost all the known gold fields are in the Far East. Thanks to those resources, the Soviet Union was among the leading gold-producing countries before the war. While some distance behind South Africa, the Soviet pre-war output was about equal to that of Canada and the United States. Gold mining and ore processing is now a large-scale, highly mechanized industry which occupies a leading place in the Far East.

The following are the most important gold centers: (a) in the Irkutsk Oblast, at Bodaibo, on the Viterno River; (b) in the Chita Oblast, in the north in the Burguzin taiga, and in the south near Nerchinsk (one of the richest gold mines) and Balei; (c) in the Khabarovsk Krai along the upper reaches of the Kolyma River, along the Zeia River, and on the lower Amur; (d) in Birobidzhan, at Soutar; (e) in the Yakut Republic, especially around the city of Aldan. The Aldan district, now connected to the railroad by a highway, is the largest industrial center of Yakutia and possibly the main gold-producing center of the Far East.

Gold, to be sure, has no longer the same attractiveness it had during the nineteenth century, when it was the generally accepted and used form of money. Yet, in international trade gold has kept its significance. Its real value in the future will depend on the type of international monetary arrangements which is made. But, whatever the arrangements, it is likely that gold will always be accepted by many countries as an agreeable means of payment.

[13] Gold was mined near Vladivostok by the ancient aborigines hundreds of years before the coming of the Russians.

Besides gold, there are also other precious metals such as *platinum* and *silver* in relatively small quantities.

"In recent years, considerable *manganese* beds have been discovered northwest of Khabarovsk, at Volochaevska station on the Amur Railway. Indications of manganese ores have also been observed in the Olginsko-Sudzu Khin region and on the Lesser Khingan."[14] It is not known whether such ore will be earmarked for the Far Eastern metallurgical industry or whether part of it will be exported. Anyway, it is worth while recalling that the United States, before the war, was importing between 90 and 97 per cent of its required manganese ore,[15] and that, in 1940, 340 million pounds of manganese ore came from the Soviet Union.[16] Most of that ore originated in the Ukraine and was shipped via the Atlantic Ocean, but due to recent developments in Far Eastern manganese mining, part of the American requirements might in the future be supplied by the Soviet Far East and be transported via the Pacific Ocean.

Tungsten is found in large quantities in the Buriat-Mongol Republic, in the Chita Oblast, and in the Khabarovsk Oblast in the upper reaches of the Bureya River. Perhaps it should be emphasized that the United States imported, in 1940, roughly 40 per cent of its requirements of tungsten ore. Although no conclusion can yet be offered, here is a question for further investigation.

Similar remarks are valid in the case of *molybdenum,* available in Buriat-Mongolia, in the Chita Oblast, and in the Khabarovsk Krai, since of this metal the United States imported in 1940 one-third of its requirements.

It is not possible to review here all the mineral resources of the Far East, but these resources are considerable, and, doubtless, offer opportunities for internal development and foreign trade. They include, besides the above mentioned ones, *tin* (large quantities), *nickel, zinc, lead, graphite, bauxite,* and *fluorspar.*

The main item in pre-war export trade was *furs.* Particularly, in the Soviet exports to the United States furs represented more than half the total value of American purchases (13.5 million dollars out of 22.3 million, in 1940).[17]

[14] *Nature and Natural Resources,* p. 20.
[15] G. A. Roush, *Strategic Mineral Supplies,* New York, 1939, p. 48.
[16] Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1939, p. 129.
[17] Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1939, p. 129.

SIBERIAN MINERALS

ARCTIC OCEAN

ANADYR
MARKOVO
TIKSI
VERKHNE-KOLYMSK
SEIMCHAN
MAGADAN
VILYUISK
YAKUTSK
NELKAN
SEA OF OKHOTSK
AYAN
OKHA
UDSKOE
NIKOLAEVSK
ALEKSANDROVSK
ALDAN
BODAIBO
KIRENSK
UST KUT
TSIPIKAN
KOMSOMOLSK
KHABAROVSK
CHITA
BLAGOVESHCHENSK
SEA OF JAPAN
ULAN UDE
IRKUTSK
URGA
VLADIVOSTOK

LENA
ALDAN
KOLYMA

LEGEND

- BORDERS OF REPUBLICS
- BORDERS OF REGIONS ETC.
- RAILROADS
- COAL
- GOLD
- LEAD. ZINC
- IRON
- MOLYBDENUM
- ANTIMONY
- MANGANESE
- TIN
- WOLFRAM
- OIL

In the future, it seems that the mineral riches of the Soviet Far East should bring about a change in the composition of Soviet exports and new developments in the American-Russian stream of goods across the Pacific.

Other resources. A good part of the Soviet Far East is covered with a limitless and varied supply of timber.[18] As a consequence a wood-manufacturing industry, paper manufacturing, and chemical works have grown up. The Pacific Coast and some rivers are also supplied with fish in sufficient quantities not only to provide good food for the local population but also to permit the development of fish-canning factories. Since the northern part of the American Pacific Coast has the same endowment, timber and fish, an exchange of goods will probably not develop. There is, to be sure, a danger of competition. But this threat can very well be thwarted by economic cooperation.

V. Economic Development

The whole Far East was, up to the end of the nineteenth century, an economically undeveloped area, with a very small population of primitive peoples who carried on a precarious life by hunting and fishing. A hostile climate, an unbroken wilderness, the difficulties and slowness of transportation, and, finally, the remoteness of this area from the centers of civilization did not encourage agricultural and industrial development.

Yet, since the middle of the nineteenth century, the Czarist government, in its general policy of colonizing Siberia, gave especial attention to the southern fringe of the territory. To protect the border against Japanese and Chinese inroads, it attempted to build a long and narrow stretch of settlements along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. After the Russo-Japanese War, efforts to organize a line of defense, based on agricultural settlements and a few industries, were intensified. The completion of a railroad line from Moscow to Vladivostok brought a revolutionary change in the position of the Far East, making it possible to send in men and material. In their first attempts to populate the Far East, the Czars sent orders to some Cossack battalions to settle with their wives and children along the Amur and Ussuri. They were scattered in small villages and told to till the land and provide themselves with means of subsistence. Their real task was to defend the border. The Cossacks, working under terrible conditions, did the first pioneer job. Then Russian peasants began to immigrate. They, too, had to cope with many difficulties, but gradually adjustments came, means of livelihood were found, on a low level to be sure, and a few cities grew up. In 1910 Khabarovsk had 50,000 inhabitants and Vladivostok, 90,000 inhabitants.

The First World War, the Civil War, and foreign intervention brought considerable trouble, destruction, and hindrance to the economic development of the Far East. Not before 1923 were the Soviets able to tackle the problem of reconstruction and advancement. By 1928, the level of 1913 was approximately re-established. The three successive Five-Year Plans gave particular emphasis to, with adequate appropriations for, a hastened and enlarged economic development of the region. During the second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937) the Khabarovsk and Maritime Territories alone got 4 per cent of the total capital investments of the Soviet Union, whereas their population was hardly 1.5 per cent of the total Soviet population. The third Five-Year Plan (1938-1942) allocated to the same region 10 per cent of all the capital investments of the U.S.S.R. Although the Far East was less advertised, it received as much attention as did the industrial centers of the Urals and the Kuznetsk Basin.

Land cultivation was the first activity which needed to be and actually was promoted, because in such a remote country it is indispensable to produce on the spot the major part of the means of subsistence. No industrial life, no city life can carry on if it does not find, at close range, the basic necessities of life. As noted above, in the Czarist times land settlements were encouraged. Agriculture, some local handicrafts, mainly wood-working, and some commerce, especially at Vladivostok, developed. In recent years, under Soviet government, agriculture has derived considerable strength from the parallel development of manufacturing and transportation, both in the Far East and in Soviet Russia at large. Nowadays, agriculturists are equipped with tractors, trucks, combines, and all sorts of agri-

[18] Cf. A. Tsymek, *The Forest Wealth of the Soviet Far East and Its Exploitation,* U.S.S.R. Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936.

cultural implements. Moreover, local facilities such as cold-storage plants, meat-packing houses, macaroni factories, and sugar refineries, have been built, which make it easy to process and preserve local agricultural products.

Thanks to a new type of land tenure and farm organization, to mechanization, to better transportation, and, generally speaking, to economic-planning administrative machinery, Far Eastern agriculture had reached, by 1938, a relatively high level. The total sown area was nearly 7 million acres, most of which were sown to grain. Yet, Far Eastern agriculture was somewhat below the Soviet average. With 3.4 per cent of the total population, the Far East had only 2 per cent of the total sown acreage. Whereas in the Soviet Union the area sown is 2 acres per capita, the Far East has only 1.16 acres per capita. The relative position of the Far East is a little better when the *grain acreage only* is considered; the Far East has 2.28 per cent of the Soviet grain acreage; the acreage per capita is one and one-half acres in the Soviet Union and one acre in the Far East.[19] Before the war the Far East was a grain importing region, producing but two-thirds of the requirements of its population. Until the late thirties, grain occupied eight- or nine-tenths of the sown area (with a lower share in the Khabarovsk and Maritime Territories). In recent years there has been a marked tendency toward a diversification of crops. More land is given to vegetables, potatoes, sugar beets, and to industrial crops such as flax, hemp, soya bean, and rubber-bearing plants.

Since 1938, the total sown area seems to have increased at a higher rate than population. As an illustration, the sown area in the Maritime Province rose by 37 per cent from 1941 to 1942; although increases were smaller in other districts, they were substantial enough. It is likely at the present time that the Far East is on a level with the pre-war Soviet average, as far as the acreage and production per capita are concerned.

VI. Industrial Development

Before the First World War, the Far East had very little industrial activity. A few local small enterprises, handicraft rather than industrial, supplied only a minor part of the demand, and most of the finished products required by the region had to be brought in by a long trans-Siberian haul. Among the pre-revolution industries may be mentioned gold mining, which was probably the leading industry, shipyards at Vladivostok and at Blagoveshchensk, railway-building shops in Nikolsk-Ussuriiskii (now Vorochilov), and the arsenal at Khabarovsk.

In the late thirties, after two decades of feverish creative work, there were in the Far East three major centers of industrial activity, plus a few minor ones:

a. *The Baikal Industrial Center* includes Irkutsk, Ulan Ude, Petrovsk-za, Baikalsk, and Chita; it covers the southern parts of the Irkutsk Oblast, the Buriat-Mongol Republic, and the Chita Oblast, stretching more than 500 miles along the Mongolian border. This industrial area is based on a favorable supply of local raw materials—abundant coal fields near Irkutsk; iron ore west of Irkutsk, near Ulan Ude, and east of Chita; manganese north of Irkutsk on the shore of Lake Baikal; tin in large quantities in the southern part of the Chita Oblast; tungsten southeast of Chita, and lead north of Ulan Ude, on the eastern shore of Lake Baikal.

As pointed out previously, the region is well endowed with hydroelectric power potentialities. Moreover, the trunk line of the Trans-Siberian Railroad serving Irkutsk, Ulan Ude, and Chita provides transportation both to the west and east. The two large waterway systems are accessible, either from Lake Baikal to the Lena River and to the Angara-Ienissei, or from Chita to the Chilka and Amur rivers. The first waterway system (Baikal-Lena or Baikal-Ienissei) leads to the Arctic Ocean, which is now navigable most of the year, and the second to the Pacific Ocean.

The second Five-Year Plan gave a great momentum to industrial development. The investment program (1934 to 1937 or after) reveals the following projects, most of which, if not all, were probably completed upon the eve of the war.

At and around Irkutsk: two power plants (capacity 9,000 kilowatts and 24,000 kilowatts); two railroad-car-building works (one with a projected capacity of 10,000 truck cars a year); several sawmills, furniture factories,

[19] In the United States, there are 1.38 acres of cereals per capita, but other crops are much more developed than in the U.S.S.R.

and other lumber works; a soap factory (capacity, 20,000 tons per year); a meat-packing plant (capacity 8,800 tons); a fish cannery (capacity 5 million cans); a standard housing-manufacturing factory (capacity, 150,000 sq. meters of floor space).

At Ulan Ude, a large locomotive and car-repair-and-building works, a meat-packing plant, a flat-glass works, and lumber factories.

At Petrovskza-Baikalsk, important iron and steel works.

At Chita, soap factory, power plant, sheepskin-coat factory, cold-storage plant.

Moreover, numerous relatively small highway, railroad, and waterway projects were cleverly devised so as to considerably improve transportation in the area. For instance, a 166-mile road from Angara River to Lena River, combined with a river control project for the Angara, provides interconnection between two huge waterways, the Lena and the Ienissei.

b. *The Lower Amur Industrial Center* includes Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk, Komsomolsk, Nikolaevsk, and Birobidzhan. This industrial area is not so well endowed with mineral resources as the Baikal area. It possesses, however, important coal fields on the middle reaches of the Bureya River (200 miles northwest of Khabarovsk), iron-ore deposits in the Little Khingan (Birobidzhan) and near Nikolaevsk, some zinc in Birobidzhan and tungsten on the upper reaches of the Bureya River. This area has the advantage of a relatively good climate, of good transportation (Trans-Siberian Railroad and Amur River) with easy access to the sea, either to the north (Nikolaevsk) or to the west (Sovetskaya Gavan) or to the south (Vladivostok, through the Ussuri Valley). It has potentialities for hydroelectric-power development, some of which have already been developed. Finally, the region, particularly the Taiga, has considerable timber capable of supplying an enormous lumber and paper industry.

The investment program of the second Five-Year Plan included:

At Blagoveshchensk, electric-power stations, broadcasting station, cold-storage plant, etc.

At Khabarovsk, power plant (24,000 kilowatts), automobile assembly plant, furniture factory, oil refinery, various food industries (macaroni, meat packing, etc.), and port facilities on the Amur River.

At Komsomolsk, the city of Yatth, huge iron and steel works (estimated investment, 245 million rubles), one of the biggest shipyards in the world (investment estimated at 230 million rubles), plus various food industries, such as fish canning.

As already said, this Lower Amur area was one of the first developed in the Far East and is now the main economic center east of the 120° meridian. As its hinterland to the north develops, this region will maintain its progress. One may gather from scattered hints that both the Baikal and the Lower Amur industrial centers have been developed more than originally scheduled in the second Five-Year Plan, because of the menace of war with Japan. Probably, more emphasis than originally planned has been given to heavy industries and armament factories.

c. *The Lower Ussuri* economic area is practically restricted to Vladivostok with the neighboring towns of Voroshilov and Spassk. This area is a commercial center for the trade with China, Japan, and America, and a military and naval base. The second Five-Year Plan made appropriations for the mechanization of port facilities, for power plant, broadcasting station, and food industries at Vladivostok, and for various lumber factories and food industries in the region, with especial emphasis given to the promotion of fishing.

As far as mineral wealth is concerned, the Lower Ussuri area has the Suchan coal deposits, and also iron ore, zinc, and lead in the Sikhota-Alin range.

The great vulnerability of Vladivostok, which is surrounded by Japan on three sides, accounts for a relative lag in the industrial progress of the region. Vladivostok is no longer the only terminal of the Trans-Siberian Railroad as it used to be when the only trunk line was the Chita-Harbin-Vladivostok track. Now most of the traffic is directed to the northern lines towards Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Nikolaevsk, and Sovetskaya Gavan. When the Japanese menace is removed, Vladivostok and its region is likely to assume again, and probably on a much larger scale than ever before, its role as a shipping and trading center to neighboring countries and to America.

Besides these three major centers, the following regions are beginning to win a place in the sun:

SIBERIAN TRANSPORTATION ROUTES

ARCTIC OCEAN

ANADYR

MARKOVO

TIKSI

VERKHNE - KOLYMSK

SEIMCHAN

MAGADAN

VILYUISK

YAKUTSK

NELKAN

AYAN

OKHA

ALDAN

UDSKOE

NIKOLAEVSK

ALEKSANDROVSK

BODAIBO

KIRENSK

UST KUT

TSIPIKAN

KOMSOMOLSK

KHABAROVSK

TULUN

CHITA

ULAN UDE

IRKUTSK

BLAGOVESHCHENSK

URGA

VLADIVOSTOK

LENA

ALDAN

KOLYMA

SEA OF OKHOTSK

SEA OF JAPAN

LEGEND

- BORDERS OF REPUBLICS
- BORDERS OF REGIONS ETC.
- HIGHWAYS
- RAILROADS
- WATER ROUTES
- AIRWAYS
- AIRFIELDS

Sakhalin Island is an important oil-producing and oil-refining center, and may become a supplying center for transoceanic air routes.

The northern shore of the Sea of Okhotsk is an outlet to and from the northern settlements in the Kolyma River region.

The southern part of *Kamchatka Peninsula* has oil, zinc, fish, and lumber. As transoceanic air transportation is developed, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski will naturally be the springboard to Dutch Harbor and to Seattle.

VII. Transportation

Transportation has always been the greatest problem facing Siberia. Up to the beginning of this century reindeer-driven sleighs were the usual conveyances, or else people walked or rode horseback. Big rivers also supplied a welcome and cheap means of transportation. The eastward migrations were largely made from river to river. When Lake Baikal had been reached, the stream of pioneers veered northward, following down the Lena River to the Arctic Ocean. Later on, when the Amur River was discovered, the trend was often toward the Pacific Ocean. Relatively short portages from river to river were enough to permit a long haul from European Russia to the Pacific Ocean.

In the last three or four decades, transportation in Siberia has been thoroughly revolutionized. At the turn of the century the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad made it possible to reach Vladivostok from Moscow in some fifteen days. To appreciate the change, it must be remembered that it formerly took more than a year. Next, development of automobiles and trucks brought motor highways, replacing the old "track," a muddy, dusty, or frozen road. More recently aviation has opened up new possibilities, and made remote settlements accessible in a few hours. Economic outposts in the Great North are no longer isolated, as they can readily get supplies and emergency help. Sick people can be evacuated promptly and scientific expeditions brought in and out easily. Finally, the opening of the Arctic Ocean route has given an outlet to northward bound rivers. The Ienissei, the Lena, the Indigirka, the Kolyma do not flow any longer into a dead sea, but their traffic can join in the world flow of shipping.

Since the first operation of the Trans-Siberian, railroad transportation has made much progress. There are, or soon will be, three trunk lines running west-east: (a) the old Trans-Siberian crossing Manchukuo (now in Japanese hands); (b) the Russian Trans-Siberian running from Chita to Rukhlovo, Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok, roughly paralleling the Amur River to the north; (c) the improperly christened Baikal-Amur Railroad, now in the making, runs north of Lake Baikal, probably passing through Kirensk, on the upper reaches of the Lena River, and then eastward to Komsomolsk. This line will follow, at some 300-400 miles north, the line mentioned under (b) and will provide safe inland transportation and open new regions to economic development, such as the lumber industry, the fur trade, and gold mining.

South-north transportation has been augmented recently by good highways. One connects Irkutsk with the upper reaches of the Lena (Kirensk), thus securing an uninterrupted connection from Irkutsk to the Arctic Ocean. A second links the Trans-Siberian, near Rukhlovo, to Yakutsk, joining the Lena middle basin with the Aldan basin and giving these two regions an outlet to the Pacific, via railroad. A third highway runs from Magadan, a port on the Sea of Okhotsk, to the upper reaches of the Kolyma River. Furthermore, a highway paralleling the Trans-Siberian and one from Vladivostok to Komsomolsk have been constructed. Available information shows that these various highways are well-built and well-kept.

It is worth mentioning that during the winter months, when the sea is icebound, a frozen highway from Okha, the tip of Sakhalin Island, to Komsomolsk, is very suitable for trucking.

Finally, air transportation has been developed at a tremendous rate, much more than in the United States. The southern part of the Far East (Irkutsk to Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, and Vladivostok) is now well served by a good network of airfields and bases. The northern part is beginning to be organized, too. A main line runs from Irkutsk to Kirensk, Yakutsk, Seimchan, and Anadyr, thus nearing Alaska. Yakutsk is a crossroad where a north-south route joins the mouth of the Lena River with the Trans-Siberian. It may be surmised that, after the war, with so many airplanes and aircraft-building industries, air transportation will become more and more popular. It may be the key opening huge expanses of unexplored territory.

AIR TRANSPORTATION ACROSS THE NORTHERN PACIFIC: THE SEATTLE-KHABAROVSK ROUTE

By GILBERT L. GIFFORD, *Acting Assistant Professor of Transportation, University of Washington*

The existence of and advantages of great circle routes have been known to navigators and geographers for several hundred years. There are many people, however, who do not realize that the shortest route from Florida to Liverpool is via New York and Newfoundland. It is difficult to realize that Kiska is directly between Seattle and Tokyo via the shortest route. Most of us are familiar only with the Mercator map which emphasizes what is east and west of us and gives us the impression that there is nothing north or south except ice and polar bears. But if one looks at a globe, it is easy to understand how the great circle routes are shorter.

The northern route from Seattle to the Orient is about 2,000 miles shorter than the route from San Francisco via Honolulu, Wake, and Manila. A fast cargo vessel traveling over the shortest route, Seattle to Vladivostok, would take about sixteen days. It is, however, easier for planes to benefit from shorter great circle routes, because they are not stopped by ice as ships are. The new multi-engined aircraft is capable of making the trip in less than 24 hours. This route undoubtedly will be used following the war.

When Pan-American Airways started operations in Alaska in 1932 it was with the idea of using that operation not only as a laboratory for Arctic operations, but also as a steppingstone on the way to the Orient. Unfavorable political relations in the Pacific at that time turned P.A.A. to the central and much longer route. Nevertheless, the northern route is being used now in military operations to an extent that will amaze the world when the story can be told.

We can only guess at the airports that are located along this route. Regular service with large equipment is given to Anchorage, Fairbanks, Nome, and Bethel. From this we can surmise that airports, satisfactory for postwar international air operations, are available. Vague as the actual information is concerning facilities in Alaska, even less is known regarding facilities in Siberia. Hence, in order to project a postwar commercial air line between Siberia and the Pacific Northwest, we are forced to take a map and pick our route from point to point upon the basis of distance and relative locations.

Before the war all of the major airlines had planned to use the DC4 type of equipment (4 engine, 240 mph, long-range craft capable of carrying 15,500 pounds of cargo a distance of 1,500 miles). Upon the basis of this type of performance, the first stop can then be Anchorage, Alaska, 1,470 miles from Seattle. From Anchorage, the route can be projected about 1,060 miles to Anadyr on the Bering Sea just below the Arctic circle. The next hop would be to Petropavlovsk on the eastern side of Kamchatka, a distance of 1,030 miles. From Petropavlovsk the route would lie across the Sea of Okhotsk, the northern part of Sakhalin Island, and up the Amur River to the city of Khabarovsk. This last leg of 1,060 miles would take the traveler into one of the most promising parts of eastern Siberia. Khabarovsk, because of its industrial resources, seems destined to play an important part in the industrial development of this part of the world.

From Kahbarovsk connections can be made with the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which connects Manchuria and Russia. This center can well be the jumping-off-place by air to any point in Siberia, Mongolia, China, the Japanese Islands, or the points farther south. It lies 410 miles north of Vladivostok, 1,070 miles from Tokyo, 1,350 miles from Shanghai, and 2,130 miles from Chungking. Khabarovsk, as a distribution center for international traffic, has the advantage of being located close to all the major population centers of northern Asia. Oil from Sakhalin is refined in this area and is available also on Kamchatka. Since

Alaska will have gasoline from the Norman Wells project, it would appear that fuel for this route should be easily available at not too great a cost.

Rapid transportation and communication speed up business in any area. Once projected into this part of the world, an airline would build up demands for its service. If it were subsidized by the governments of the United States and Russia to get it started, the increased trade brought about would soon make the line independent of subsidies. This would be a business line; the central and longer route would carry more of the tourist trade. Business men, salesmen, and diplomats would find this northern short route a real time-saver, allowing them to make a business trip to the Orient and return within a week. Mail would be speeded up by two weeks as compared with steamer time. Machine tools and precision instruments made in the United States could be speedily transported to the new industrial areas of the Lake Baikal region. Furs, mercury, tungsten, tin, and cargo of similar nature would be sent in return.

One big advantage that the airplane has in this area is the ability to serve icebound ports. All of the ports in Siberia are frozen over from one to six months of the year. Vladivostok can be kept open by use of ice-breakers, but Nikolaevsk, Okhotsk, and others are closed to shipping a large part of the winter. Air-transport operation under arctic weather conditions has been carried on until this is no longer a problem. Improved radio equipment is chiefly responsible for making such operation possible. The technical knowledge is available, and the equipment is being given strenuous tests over global routes day and night by the Army, Navy, and commercial operators.

One of the big problems standing in the way of postwar international air transport is that of use of the air. The controversy is one of "freedom of the air" versus "sovereignty of the air." Most nations, including the United States and Russia, subscribe to the theory that a nation has control over all of the airspace above its territory. Perhaps reciprocal landing rights may be agreed upon by the various countries involved. These landing rights are the most important asset a foreign airline can own.

The policy of the countries involved will, of course, influence the international air-transportation service offered to and from the Pacific Northwest. Whatever the policy, if air transport to the Orient is made available, some of it is sure to be via the short northern route. There is one way that the Pacific Northwest is sure to share in the business, and that is in the supplying of the northern bases used by aircraft. This will all be done by ship and since Seattle is the gateway to Alaska, the supplies will move from that port.

The prospect for a northern route to the Orient is very good and it seems that the routes pioneered by Lindbergh, Post, and Gatty will be global thoroughfares before many years have passed.

ACROSS THE NORTH POLE TO AMERICA

By M. Gromov, *Member of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.*

The shortest distance between the Soviet Union and America is across the top of the earth. The suggestion of establishing service via such a route is a striking instance of the endeavor of aviation to be independent of land routes. It is said that an airplane, like a bird, can fly straight to its destination, undeterred by mountains, forests, and seas. But in practice, as we know, this is far from the case. Until recently it was believed (especially abroad) that flying in the Arctic was impossible. However, the development of polar aviation has shown that to Soviet planes and Soviet airmen the stern North is no insuperable barrier.

The flight to America across the North Pole was the fifth of my long-distance flights. We worked on the details of this flight for two years, with the result that many problems which had formerly seemed insoluble were cleared up. It was proposed to use a monoplane (RD No. 25-1) of the classical type with underslung wings, which at that time was undoubtedly the most suitable craft in the world for long-distance flying, since it was the embodiment of the most up-to-date innovations in aircraft construction. A machine of this type had been displayed in 1936 at the World Aviation Exhibition in Paris and had profoundly impressed the experts.

We did everything we could to reduce the weight of the machine. We removed the rubber chambers which enabled the plane to keep afloat on water, adapted the engine-covers to serve as sleeping bags, decided to do without brandy and firearms, and reduced the food supply from 2 months' to 1½ months' ration. We thus managed to lighten the load by nearly 400 pounds, and accordingly increased the supply of fuel, oxygen, and water for the engine by this amount. The original range of the RD No. 25-1 was 4,350 miles. But a geared engine was installed, which increased the range to 6,200 miles. Experiments showed that the corrugated surface should be replaced by a smooth surface, which again increased the range by roughly another 1,250 miles. After covering the anterior edge of the wing with a polished surface, we were able to fly 7,700 miles without a stop. The installation of metal propellers still further increased the range; a great deal of experimentation was required in order to determine the most satisfactory propeller.

Having made a thorough and careful study of our craft, we ascertained what height and speed should be maintained as the flying weight of the plane changed with expenditure of fuel. In the end, we had at our disposal extensive charts showing what speed and elevation to maintain under various conditions. This information proved to be one of the most important factors determining the success of our nonstop flight.

Weather conditions received our careful consideration. The comparatively small margin of stability of the plane in the early hours of the flight, owing to excessive load, demanded calm weather at least during this period. After that the only serious danger to be feared was the formation of ice on the propeller and wings. We studied everything published at home and abroad on the reasons for this phenomenon so as to find a means of combating it. We finally arrived at the conclusion that the lower the temperature, the less the chances of ice forming, and that in clouds at a high altitude this danger was entirely eliminated. At a temperature below –20°C. the danger of ice forming was very slight. It was therefore necessary, in the event of the danger of ice forming, that our plane should be able to reach an altitude where the temperature was below –20°C.

Before the start an event occurred which rather altered the character of our task. Chkalov, Baidukov, and Belyakov made their splendid flight to America. It was no longer enough to fly to any point in the United States. It must now be our purpose not only to confirm the possibility of a trans-polar air route, but to attain the maximum distance of flight. Such being the case, weather conditions assumed cardinal importance. In this respect the year

1937 was generally unfavorable for flying in the Arctic. On the eve of the start we were told by prominent meteorologists that we must expect head winds and unfavorable weather. However, time did not permit us to wait for better weather. Moreover, we calculated that even with such unfavorable weather conditions we could beat the world distance record. All that was needed was to adhere strictly to the altitude charts, to maintain a definite regime for the engine, and not to deviate from our course. We must not turn aside to avoid cyclones or other meteorological obstacles, for that would considerably reduce our range. We would have to fly in a straight line. Of course we knew that some deviations from the ideal schedule, and consequent loss of distance, would be inevitable; but we decided to reduce them to a minimum.

We took off on July 12, 1937. The start was an unusually difficult one. If the plane had carried another 200 pounds the runway would have been too short for the take-off. The end of the runway was startlingly near, and I had to lift the plane steeply to keep the wheels from touching the rough ground beyond its edge. We were hardly off the ground when we began to retract the landing gear.

After five hours of flight, Yumashev took my place at the controls, and I addressed myself to some refreshment. On the basis of the speed and time of flight, Danilin calculated the time when we should approach Kolguyev Island. Yumashev brought the plane down below the clouds and we saw the island beneath us. When we descended to about 650 feet, the plane was buffeted violently. At this height we passed over the spot where the referee of the Central Aeronautical Club of the U.S.S.R. was to register our transit. Had it not been for this, of course, we would not have descended so low and subjected our craft to the risk of being smashed by the heavy jolting. Yumashev lifted the plane to its former altitude. I replaced him at the controls.

Down below, the blue waters of the Barents Sea were visible. We were heading for Novaya Zemlya. We first spied it at a distance of 60 miles. As we approached within 30 miles of it a picture of unusual beauty and mystery opened before us. From afar, Novaya Zemlya looked like the sunlit shore of a southern sea, with long sandy banks of vivid hue, reminiscent of sunshine and warmth. A layer of strato-cumulus cloud approached from the left and concealed the sea. Over Novaya Zemlya we twice descended to a level of 1,000-1,300 feet to have our flight registered. We then slightly altered our course to hit the 120th meridian at the spot where it led straight through Rudolph Island to the North Pole and then on to California. Here we again rose above the clouds.

A white veil appeared on the horizon and covered the sky. This was an approaching cyclone. Several hours passed. Yumashev informed me that he had detected some dark spots below which must be Franz Josef Land. Soon we spotted the snowy summits of the archipelago. We could feel the breath of an approaching cyclone. Strata of black cloud and humpy cumuli again floated by. The scene was again overcast. The only way we could avoid the cyclone was to rise above it. We firmly stuck to our determination not to depart from our schedule unless absolutely necessary, and not to diverge from our course under any circumstances. Only forward, and only along a straight line, was our motto.

We had already reached an altitude of over 13,000 feet; the temperature had fallen to –16°C. Clouds barred our way, and nothing was to be seen. We kept our course by the radio signals from Rudolph Island, which now lay behind us. We flooded the propeller with liquid to prevent ice forming.

We continued to ascend. I noticed that the windows of the cockpit were covered with a crust of ice. Only at a height of 14,700 feet, where the temperature was –21°C., did they become transparent again. We nosed our way through high cumulus clouds. It suddenly grew lighter and the plane emerged from the clouds. Below us lay a white sea of feathery cloud. The sun shone brightly and we breathed freely. Fighting our way through two cyclones, we approached the North Pole. We had already been in the air twenty-four hours.

An hour later, to be exact, at 3:14 a.m., we passed over the North Pole. We were then at an altitude of 8,850 feet and were making a speed of 100 m.p.h. The temperature of the air was –8°C. The crew were in exceptional spirits. From time to time, through breaks in the clouds, we saw the ice beneath us, traversed by fissures. The scene was grand but monotonous. The icy wilderness seemed endless. After a while we perceived some dark

patches against the clouds on the horizon. The nearer we approached, the more distinct they became. Suddenly we saw they were cliffs. Land! This was Patrick Island.

The breaks in the clouds became more frequent. The sea between the islands and the mainland was covered by white humpy ice, spattered with emerald and blue patches. Clouds passed over us from time to time, which lent the scene a mysterious and oppressive, yet majestic air.

The Canadian tundra appeared. The sky cleared. Unknown land stretched beneath us: numberless lakes of varying size and shape, bogs, rivers, and scrub, gradually passing into forest. This monotonous landscape stretched as far as the Rocky Mountains, which well deserve their name. Keeping our course along the 120th meridian, we gradually ascended and successfully negotiated the mountain peaks. Beyond the Rockies we flew hemmed in by clouds. Ice suddenly began to form on the plane. Both the speed indicators failed. We descended, and only at a height of 9,800 feet did we emerge from the danger zone.

Shifting our course 10° or 15° to the right, we reached the shores of the Pacific in the vicinity of Seattle. Ahead of us, a splendid blue sky could be seen. As we approached San Francisco, we saw that we could fly farther. It was late in the night when we reached the midway point between San Francisco and Los Angeles. We kept straight on. We left Los Angeles behind us to the right, and headed for San Diego, but we were out of luck. The flying fields in the southernmost part of California and the whole strip, thirty miles wide, between coast and mountains were covered by morning mist. We were therefore obliged to turn back. We circled around for half an hour in search of a suitable landing place. When I decided to land there was still enough fuel in the tanks for another six hours of flying. We selected the only large, although rather uneven, field in this semi-wilderness, and 62 hours 17 minutes after the take-off in Moscow we made a successful landing some three miles from San Jacinto, California.

Reckoned in a straight line, we had flown 6,302 miles.

There was not a soul to be seen, but a minute later we noticed an old and dilapidated automobile bounding over the hummocks towards us. A young man jumped out and addressed Danilin in English. We had provided for such an emergency in Moscow and had had the following note written for us in English: "We are Soviet airmen flying to America from Moscow across the North Pole. Please inform the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, the local authorities, and the nearest flying field that we have safely landed."

The young man leaped into his car and dashed to the telegraph office. A moment later the field was invaded by people and automobiles. Learning that we had flown from Moscow, the inhabitants of San Jacinto at once began to assail us with requests for our autographs.

Later wherever we went we were deafened by the shouts of welcome, rendered hoarse by the speeches we delivered at banquets, and blinded by the endless magnesium flashes of the ubiquitous reporters and photographers.

Our flight was not undertaken for sensational purposes; our aim was a technical one—to establish the shortest air route between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. We flatter ourselves that our flight has helped to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two countries. It has also performed no little service in respect to exchange of experience between the aircraft industries of the two countries.

SOVIET FARMING ORGANIZATION: THE KOLKHOZES

By Robert Mossé

The *kolkhoz*[1] or collective farm has become the usual pattern of agricultural life throughout the territory of the Soviet Union, in the Siberian Far East as well as in the Ukraine. It is the fundamental organization within which some one hundred million Russian peasants live and toil and cause the earth to supply them with the basic necessities. It is based on the socialist theory that the right to use the land belongs to the members of the community, but that perpetual ownership is retained by the State. From an operational standpoint, the major part of the land is cultivated jointly by all the members of the collective farm. From a distribution standpoint, there is an original socialistic system of compensation by profit sharing.

Although it is a genuine product of the Socialist Revolution, the kolkhoz has some sociological and psychological roots in an old Russian tradition. For many centuries before the Revolution, the peasants had been used to the *mir,* a collective ownership of the land, with, usually, periodical allotments of tracts for individual cultivation. Visiting Russia in 1888, Georg Brandes wrote that the ownership of land in common is one of the fundamental characteristics which distinguish the Russian people from all others.[2] This helps to explain the fact that the kolkhozes could grow and flourish in Russia more readily than in other countries, where farmers are highly individualistic.

The wholesale collectivization of Russian agriculture, i.e., its organization into kolkhozes, began in 1929. By the end of the first Five-Year Plan, almost all the cultivable land and all peasant families had been brought into kolkhozes, but this was not done without bitter struggles. Many peasants vigorously opposed the strong policy of collectivization, which at the beginning was very drastic. The peasants had a powerful weapon: they could starve the whole country; as a consequence the Soviet authorities had to take into account the reaction of the peasants. The inner structure of the kolkhoz was, therefore, adjusted so as to make room for individualistic motives and aspirations. The present form — an elaborate compromise—was reached by 1935 and embodied in the "model statutes." Since that time no major change has taken place.

The collective farm system has obtained two remarkable results. First, the socialistic pattern of land cultivation and life has won the unanimous support and sincere devotion of the peasants to the Soviet regime; the victories of the Red Army are to be ascribed largely to the peasants, who have, thanks to the kolkhoz, something to fight for. Secondly, the grain crops, at the time of the third Five-Year Plan, were almost twice as great as in the pre-Revolution years, which has meant a substantial increase in the standard of living of the people, whose diet had almost always been insufficient in the past.

In the following pages the reader will find: (1) a summary of the domestic constitution of the kolkhoz; (2) a few comments on its relationship to the State and to the national economy.

Domestic Constitution of the Kolkhoz

A collective farm is a village community consisting of a few scores or hundreds of families settled down on a few hundred hectares of arable land.[3] The major part of the land, consisting of large tracts, is cultivated, under the leadership of the kolkhoz staff, by members of the kolkhoz, organized into teams. They usually have mechanical appliances, such as tractors and harvesting combines. As far as the technical organization of work is concerned, the kolkhoz is very much like any big capitalist farm, but this superficial likeness is overshadowed by the democratic constitution

[1] Abbreviation of "kollectivnoe khoziaistvo," meaning collective economy.

[2] Georg Brandes, *Impressions of Russia,* New York, 1889, p. 19.

[3] By 1937 the "average" kolkhoz included 76 families and had 476 hectares of arable land (1176 acres), but there were wide differences among kolkhozes.

of the kolkhoz and by a profit-sharing system of compensation.

Within the village community the peasant families have their own houses, together with a private piece of land[4] to cultivate as they please. On this private homestead they grow vegetables and fruits for the household; they raise some poultry; they often have a cow and possibly a few pigs and sheep. The recognition of such a private homestead came as a turning point, after a few attempts at wholesale collectivization. On this point Stalin has said: "It is better directly and honestly to grant that a collective farm family should have its own *private* husbandry, a small one but its *private* one. . . . Since there are such things as family, children, personal requirements and personal tastes, we cannot ignore them. And you have no right to ignore private everyday interests of the collective farmers. Otherwise the collective farms cannot be consolidated. A combination of the *private* interests of the collective farmers with the collective interests of the kolkhozes is the key to the consolidation of the kolkhozes."[5]

It is not merely through the organization of private homesteads within the kolkhoz that the personal interests of the peasants are satisfied. The constitution and working of the kolkhoz is also designed to combine the personal and the general interests.

The kolkhoz is supposed to be a democratically organized community. Some kind of legislative power belongs to the general assembly of all its members; this body establishes the broad directives for the community; it votes for an executive committee and for the president and vice-president of the kolkhoz. The president is the actual leader; he is in charge of the daily work, and might be likened to a plant manager. Although, theoretically, he should be elected by the general assembly, in practice such a democratic procedure has not always been followed. More often than not, he is a professional leader, nominated by the central government, the election by the assembly being perfunctory. The vice-president is usually a local man.

The most original feature of the kolkhozes is the system of distribution. For accounting purposes, a unit, called the "work day," is used, which, strangely enough, does not correspond to a period of time but to a specified amount of work. All jobs and tasks are classified and given specific valuations in "work days." Work requiring skill is usually highly priced, so that a mechanic can very well in one day accomplish work valued at 4 work days or more. In all kolkhozes there is a well established statistical section. By the end of the year, each member has his own line of credit in "work days." Then, when the crop is gathered and delivered or sold, the total labor cost within the kolkhoz is easily figured as being the total of all work day credits. It is easy by that time to figure out the value of each work day in terms of goods or money. If 10,000 work days have been credited against a total money income of 20,000 rubles, then each work day will be worth two rubles. Each member will receive a total income equal to the number of work days posted on his account multiplied by the value of the work day.

Such a system gives a twofold incentive to the workers. First, the more one works (in quantity and quality, not in time) the more work days are posted on his account. Secondly, the better the results of the kolkhoz, as a whole, the higher the value of the work days, by the time of reckoning. Russian peasants are of course deeply interested in the value of the work day in their kolkhoz and it is not surprising that a traveler should so often hear references to the value of the work day, whose significance is not always fully understood.

There are wide differences among kolkhoz members as to the number of work days actually credited. This is due more to differences in skill than to differences in the duration of the work. There are also great discrepancies as to the value of the work day among kolkhozes. While some kolkhozes are able to allot three rubles per work day, others distribute only one ruble. Some allot only three pounds of grain and others are able to give up to 40 pounds or more.

There is no doubt that the distributive system within the kolkhoz has served the cause of efficiency, but, on the other hand, this method has led toward an increasing inequality among the various kolkhozes. There are rich kolkhozes and poor kolkhozes and it will probably be one of the problems of the post-victory era to establish more equality.

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[4] No more than 1 hectare or 2½ acres.

[5] Stalin's words as quoted by Yakovlev, Chief of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 2nd Congress of collective farm stock workers, Moscow, 1935.

The Outward Relations of the Kolkhoz

However interesting may be the inner working and organization of the kolkhoz, it must be stressed that it is only a cell within a broader organism, the national economy of the Soviet Union. Its subordinate position is much more apparent and real than in the case of any capitalist form of enterprise. A capitalist farm is dependent upon the market and upon the overall economic conditions, but a kolkhoz is politically and administratively subservient to the government and its series of hierarchized agencies.

Each kolkhoz has its assignment within the general plan for the whole country. For example, the total wheat to be produced is allocated among republics, then among oblasts (regions), among raioni (districts), and finally among kolkhozes. The kolkhoz has very little choice in the determination of the crops, except in so far as a consultation with the kolkhoz leaders is necessary to arrive at the proper assess-

TABLE I. CULTIVATED AREAS IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST, 1938

Regions	Population		Sown Area		Grain Area		
	in thousands	*percent distribution*	*in thousand acres*	*acreage per capita*	*in thousand acres*	*acreage per capita*	*percent grain to total sown area*
1. Buriat-Mongol Republic.	541	9.28	967	1.79	872	1.61	90.1
2. Yakut Republic.....	401	6.88	251	0.63	241	0.60	96.0
3. Irkutsk Oblast.....	1,286	22.07	1,839	1.43	1,635	1.27	88.9
4. Chita Oblast.....	1,156	19.84	1,480	1.28	1,358	1.17	91.7
5. Khabarovsk Territory...	1,535	26.35	1,452	0.95	1,115	0.73	76.7
6. Maritime Territory.....	908	15.58	796	0.88	540	0.60	67.8
7. Soviet Far East Total 1 to 6.....	5,827	100.00	6,785	1.16	5,761	0.99	84.9
8. Far East as percent of U.S.S.R....	3.42	.....	2.00	58.0	2.28	66.4	.....
9. Total U.S.S.R.....	170,000	.....	338,000	2.00	253,000	1.49	74.9
10. U. S. A.....	131,000	.....	341,000	2.60	181,000	1.38	53.1

TABLE II. AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST, 1938

Regions	Tractors		Trucks		Combines	
	units	*sown acreage per unit (acres)*	*units*	*sown acreage per unit (acres)*	*units*	*sown acreage per unit (acres)*
1. Buriat-Mongol Republic.	1,248	774	911	1,061	275	3,516
2. Yakut Republic.....	427	587	111	2,261	85	2,952
3. Irkutsk Oblast.....	3,076	598	869	2,116	832	2,210
4. Chita Oblast.....	2,465	600	1,465	1,010	671	2,205
5. Khabarovsk Territory...	4,598	315	2,151	675	2,114	687
6. Maritime Territory.....	2,906	273	1,296	614	959	830
7. Soviet Far East (total 1 to 6).....	14,720	461	6,803	997	4,936	1,374
8. Far East as percent of U.S.S.R.[1]...	3.87	51.8	16.20	12.3	10.00	20.0
9. Total U.S.S.R.[1].....	380,000	889	42,000	8,047	49,400	6,842

[1] Figures for U.S.S.R. are for 1935 and therefore not quite comparable.

Sources: *Sotsialisticheskoe Selskoe Khoziaistvo,* Gosplanizdat, Moscow, 1939.

William Mandel, *The Soviet Far East,* N. Y., International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942.

ments. The individual members of the kolkhoz, however, are free to cultivate their private farmstead at will.

When the crops are gathered, the kolkhozes have to supply a certain amount to the state agencies, which will then pour them into various channels so as to secure food for the cities and industrial population. The problem of deliveries to the state has always been a very delicate one. The administration usually wants and needs much and does not want to pay too much. But if the administration is too exacting, the deliveries and production dwindle as by enchantment. Many systems have been used, among which are the three following: (a) The administration requires compulsory deliveries, as a sort of tax in kind, deliveries to be based on the land available, or as a percentage of the actual crop. (b) The administration purchases agricultural products from the kolkhozes, but, very often, the monopolist buyer's price is a low one. (c) The kolkhoz is induced to enter into agreement with a "machine and tractor station" which furnishes facilities, to be paid for by a share of the crop, and, since these machine and tractor stations are state-owned and state-operated, the deliveries to them are practically deliveries to the state.

The net product of the kolkhoz is what is left after deliveries to the state and to the "machine and tractor stations," plus receipts from sales to the state. This net product may be sold in the open market or may be distributed, in kind, among members of the kolkhoz, according to the work day rules.

In theory, the distribution system is an application of the Marxist analysis. Labor is the only determinant of "value" and the total product, without any deduction, should be allotted among laborers, according to their labor contribution. As a matter of fact the required deliveries to the state very often account for as much as half of the product without adequate direct payments. But it should not be overlooked that the government has supplied agriculture with machine and tractor stations, organized experiment stations, conducted research work concerning the selection of seeds and the use of fertilizers, trained thousands upon thousands of agronomists, veterinarians, mechanics, and so forth; it has also brought education and health services to the countryside. All these things are appreciated by the farmers. Their compulsory deliveries are a sort of investment, productive of dividends, so that the compensation for crop deliveries is not limited to the direct payments. In the early times, the requirements of the state caused much ill-feeling, but later, due to better equipment, better organization, better yields, and larger areas under cultivation, it was no longer necessary to demand such a great share of their products from the kolkhozes. A certain amount of well-being had been obtained, and it appeared to the people that collectivization, rationalization, and mechanization of agriculture was a sound, long-term policy.

Unfortunately, the German invasion and ruthlessness have destroyed many of the physical achievements. However, the progress of the past years is not lost and the best part of it will not be touched by the war. Technical progress has been assimilated, the people have reached a higher level of enlightenment, the social institutions have been worked out, and the relations between the leaders and the people have reached a reasonable degree of harmony. Since the land and a dynamic people are still there, there is no reason why Soviet agriculture should not be quickly rebuilt soon after victory.

SOVIET IDEALS AND POST-WAR COOPERATION

By Melvin Rader, *Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Washington*

There are excellent reasons why the people of the United States should be interested in the Soviet Union. First is the fact of physical proximity and, in consequence, community of interest. Relatively few miles separate Alaska from Russian territory; the citizens and soldiers of Vladivostok are closer to Seattle than they are to their own capital, Moscow. As Wendell Willkie has pointed out, Siberia has become a teeming industrial empire, of almost fabulous resources and potential wealth. Because of our proximity to this area, the United States in the post-war period will have many profitable economic relations with Russia; and, as we in the Pacific Northwest will note with satisfaction, Seattle will inevitably be the port through which most of this trade will flow.

Second, we are interested in Russia because she is our ally. The Russian people have earned our deep gratitude because, with unsurpassed heroism on a hundred battlefields, they have borne the brunt of the fighting in the war against Germany and her satellites. Since Russia, Britain, and the United States will be the most powerful nations in the immediate postwar period, it is extremely important that their cordial relations shall continue. If these nations can find a basis for enduring friendship, if they can cooperate not only in winning the war swiftly but in building a just peace, the future is bright. If they fail to do this, millions and millions of human beings may perish in a *third* World War.

Consequently, we do not have to be "left-wingers" to be deeply concerned with Soviet-American friendship. Conservative columnists like Walter Lippman, dyed-in-the-wool capitalists like Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan and Company, and conservative statesmen like Lord Beaverbrook and Cordell Hull, have pointed to the supreme need of understanding and friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Together with the other United Nations, these two great powers must struggle to establish a civilization of peace, sanity, and cooperation. If we Americans are to participate in this great effort, we must free our minds from prejudices and misunderstandings. The purpose of this brief essay is to assist in dispelling the errors of interpretation which tend to disrupt American-Soviet friendship.

As everyone knows, the doctrines of Marx and Engels, as interpreted and extended by Lenin and Stalin, provide the main theoretical foundation of the mighty Soviet efforts to work out a new pattern of human life. Certain ill-founded prejudices, which can do nothing but create mischief, are the result of widespread misinterpretations of this body of doctrine.

One of the most common misimpressions is that the official Soviet philosophy is a crude reductive materialism, which denies the efficacy of human ideals and purposes. Unlike the more naïve materialists, the Marxists recognize the existence of diverse levels of organization and complexity, appearing as successive phases of a vast evolutionary process. According to this view, electrons, atoms, molecules, cells, organisms, and personalities form a series of mounting complexity: and the higher levels, possessing new emergent qualities, cannot be exhaustively interpreted in terms which may be quite adequate for the lower. The psychological and social levels, although they evolve out of the physical, call for their own distinctive modes of explanation.

Far from denying the efficacy of consciousness, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have insisted that the poor and oppressed must become fully conscious of their misery before they can succeed in abolishing these evil conditions. They contend, moreover, that growing social consciousness and purposiveness are essential to human progress. "In nature," Engels declared, "there are only blind unconscious agencies acting upon one another. . . . In the history of society, on the other hand, the actors are all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with deliberation or passion, working toward definite goals; nothing happens without a conscious purpose, without

an intended aim."[1] In an unplanned social system, however, purpose conflicts with purpose, so that "consequences quite other than those intended" result from the "innumerable intersecting forces." Hence, a further advance is required: organized collective purposiveness must replace anarchistic individual strivings.

This interpretation of reality, as evolving through innumerable stages from unconscious electrons to purposive human beings and planned societies, is a fairly common type of philosophy in the United States and Great Britain. In essentials, it is the view maintained by such well known American philosophers as John Dewey, George Santayana, and R. W. Sellars, or such British thinkers as Samuel Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, and Alfred North Whitehead. These men, with the exception of Santayana, do not call themselves materialists, and they do not share all the philosophical concepts and social ideals of the Marxists, but they believe in the same *general* type of evolutionary naturalism. Americans should, therefore, not find anything intrinsically shocking in the Soviet philosophy of nature.

Many people, however, feel that the attitude of the Russian government toward religion is reprehensible. Once again, we are in danger of misunderstanding the Soviet position. We are told, for example, that Marx and his Russian disciples regard religion as "the opium of the people." This phrase, although used by Marx in a youthful essay, was invented by a young German intellectual, Bruno Bauer, and can scarcely be regarded as adequately expressing the more mature Marxian position. Marx's strictures against religion apply to the smug supernaturalistic religion of the nineteenth century, rather than to the more humanistic type of religion which is gaining currency today. Some people, such as Hewlett Johnson, the Dean of Canterbury, believe that there is a good deal of the essential spirit of Christianity in the Marxian and Soviet ideal of a universal cooperative commonwealth without distinction of race or class.

Admitting that the typical Soviet officials are humanists and naturalists, and that they dislike all forms of supernaturalism, we must also note a marked trend toward religious tolerance. Not only does the Soviet Constitution formally provide for freedom of religious opinion, but Stalin and the Russian government have recently entered into much more friendly relations with the Russian Orthodox Church, with no intention, however, of terminating the legal separation of Church and State. This policy, although undoubtedly influenced by western liberalism, is compatible with the Marxian tradition. Marx opposed Bakunin's idea that atheism should be a dogma binding upon all members of the First International; and Engels attacked Dühring's contention that religion should be prohibited in a socialist society. Similarly Lenin wrote: "The state must not concern itself with religion; religious societies must not be bound to the state. Every one must be absolutely free to profess whatever religion he likes or to profess no religion. . . . There must be no discrimination whatever in the rights of citizens on religious grounds."[2]

A good many critics of the Russian system, however, have felt that the Marxian interpretation of history, which has been miscalled "economic determinism," fails adequately to recognize idealistic motives and cultural factors as historical causes. The Marxian doctrine, which the Soviet leaders of course accept, conceives of the historical process as an interaction of unequal forces, of which the economic is by far the most powerful, but in which cultural factors also definitely count. Engels remarked: "Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to emphasize this main principle in opposition to our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place, or the opportunity to allow the other elements in the interaction to come into their rights."[3] Even economic causes, according to the Marxian interpretation, are channeled through men's minds and personalities; and historical events are never so completely determined that it is superfluous to invoke action and intelligence to give them the most desirable form. This view of history, which has been endorsed by Lenin and Stalin, is not unlike the interpretation of such reputable American scholars as Charles Beard and Vernon Louis Parrington.

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[1] Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of the Classical German Philosophy,* New York, International Publishers, 1935, p. 58.

[2] V. I. Lenin, *Religion,* New York, International Publishers, 1933, p. 8.

[3] Marx and Engels, *Correspondence: 1846-1895,* New York, International Publishers, 1935, p. 477.

In its tendency to emphasize practicality, rather than mere abstract idealism, the Soviet view of life is akin to our typical American outlook. Lenin and Stalin, like Marx, have contended that theory is ineffectual if not connected with practice, and that practice, in turn, is blind if it is not illumined by theory. This reminds us of John Dewey's famous pragmatic doctrine of "the continuity of theory and practice." The Russians, however, unlike the American pragmatists, insist that truth is determined by objective matters of fact rather than by "practicality." The fact remains that the ordinary Russian citizen has a great admiration for American "efficiency," and that there is a certain kinship between the Soviet emphasis upon practical achievements and the typical American desire to "bring home the bacon" and "deliver the goods."

Americans will not, in general, be so sympathetic toward Soviet social ideals; but in this respect, also, we are likely to be misled by a superficial understanding of the Russian ideals and objectives. We are prone to forget the terrific difficulties that the Soviet Union has faced, and to suppose that the Russian leaders are satisfied with evil conditions that still persist.

Socially, morally, and intellectually, any new form of society will inevitably be limited by the cultural and social conditions which it has inherited from the past. This is obviously true of the Soviet Union, where the construction of a new system began under the most difficult circumstances with a population mainly illiterate, desperately poor, and inured to centuries of tyranny, and with an economic system wrecked and demoralized by military defeat, famine, civil war, and foreign intervention. The initially low technological level made vastly more difficult the swift and prodigious mechanization of industry and agriculture. In course of time, new enemies, domestic and foreign, arose to plague the regime. It appeared necessary to achieve an iron control over internal developments, and to construct a very powerful military force in a desperately short time. Finally, it was necessary to fight and triumph in the colossal war which Hitler unleashed.

In view of these historical circumstances, it seems fairer to judge the Soviet ideals, not in terms of present shortcomings, but of announced objectives and main tendencies, which have been mainly directed toward a more democratic and moderate type of system.

As Henry Wallace, in his remarkable address at Madison Square Garden on November 8, 1942, pointed out, the Russian people have been progressing toward a broad *social* democracy. Wallace spoke of five basic forms of democracy: political democracy, of which the Bill of Rights is the most fundamental ingredient; economic democracy, which means the control of industry by and for the people; ethnic democracy, which signifies the fair and equal treatment of different racial groups; sexual democracy, which means democratic equality in the treatment of the sexes; and educational democracy, which means the broad sharing of science and culture through an adequate system of public education. The Russians, according to Wallace, have not sufficiently realized political democracy, and they conceive economic democracy differently than do most Americans, but, on the whole, they have made great strides toward the achievement of this fivefold program of social democracy.

Not all Americans will agree with Wallace's verdict, but it is difficult to deny that there has been remarkable progress in certain fields. For example, the almost complete liquidation of illiteracy among the one hundred and eighty millions of the Russian people is a prodigious achievement. The attendance at universities has grown by leaps and bounds; the circulation of individual books has increased from a few hundred or thousand copies to millions; the popular circles for singing, dancing, drama, and the graphic arts, have multiplied amazingly. In comparison with the old Czarist system, there has been a startling democratization of Russian culture.

The announced ultimate objectives of the Soviet regime, moreover, are not entirely incompatible with the American liberal ideal. Marx maintained, it is well to remember, that a socialist state such as the Soviet Union will gradually develop into a free and cooperative commonwealth. When nation is no longer arrayed against nation, or class against class, when the springs of socialized wealth are gushing bounteously, political coercion will gradually disappear. Genuine freedom, political, economic, and intellectual, will be realized on a cooperative basis, and the coercive state will "wither away."

Stalin's acceptance of these objectives is indicated by the following statement: "Briefly, the anatomy of Communist society may be described as follows: It is a society in which (a) there will be no private ownership of the means of production, but social, collective ownership; (b) there will be no classes or state, but workers in industry and agriculture managing their economic affairs as a free association of toilers; (c) national economy, organized according to plan, will be based on the highest technique in both industry and agriculture; (d) there will be no antithesis between town and country, between industry and agriculture; (e) the products will be distributed according to the principle of the old French Communists: 'from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs'; (f) science and art will enjoy conditions conducive to their highest development; (g) the individual, freed from bread-and-butter cares, and the necessity of cringing to the 'powerful of the earth,' will become really free. Clearly, we are still remote from such a society."[4] These ideals, admittedly far from realized, include the essentially liberal objectives of cooperation and the fullest personal freedom in place of coercive state control.

The immediate aims, as well as the long-range objectives, of Soviet policy, are imbued with liberal and democratic principles. The Russian government has formally subscribed to the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and the principles of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences. Stalin has declared: "The program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is: abolition of racial exclusiveness, equality of nations and the integrity of their territories, liberation of enslaved nations and the restoration of their sovereign rights, the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes, economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material welfare, restoration of democratic liberties, destruction of the Hitlerite regime."[5]

In view of these announced liberal objectives, there is good reason to hope that the lingering elements of dictatorship in the Soviet system will prove transitory, and that existing evils will turn out to be, in the words of Beatrice Webb, "the growing pains of a society that has struggled into existence in a hostile world."[6]

It would be ridiculous to deny the difference in the ideologies and social systems of the United States and the Soviet Union; but this difference does not preclude a large measure of agreement in ideals and interests, and it must not be allowed to interfere with Soviet-American cooperation in building a just and lasting peace.

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[4] Stalin, *Leninism,* New York, International Publishers, 1933, pp. 70-71.

[5] Address before the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Nov. 6, 1942.

[6] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *The Truth About Soviet Russia,* New York, Longmans, Green, 1942, p. 75.

THE RUSSIAN CHURCH AND RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION

By His Eminence METROPOLITAN BENJAMIN, *Exarch of the Moscow Patriarchate for the Americas and Head of the Russian Church's American Archdiocese of the Aleutian Islands and North America*

[Note: His Eminence here speaks through the Right Reverend Archimandrite Boris R. Burden, President of the Russian Archdiocesan Consistory, and Archdiocesan Secretary for English Affairs. Publication of the manuscript was approved in Chicago, December 12, 1943.]

The life and history, the art and culture of the Russian people and nation are fundamentally products of the influence of the Orthodox Church. The same is true in scarcely less degree of the culture of most of the numerous other peoples and nations which make up the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. There is, of course, the Armenian national state where the separated Armenian Christians predominate. There are sections very largely Mohammedan, and others still largely pagan, or at least non-Christian. In many sections Jewish influence is very strong. Along the western and Balkan borders are states in which Roman Catholic as well as Greek Catholic influences have been powerful. Despite these wide diversities in the broad extent of the Soviet Union, it is true that the spirit and culture of the whole—and especially of Russia proper—is the fruit of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The Russian Church, through its Patriarchate of Moscow and All-Russia, is a unit in that loosely organized community of national, regional, or linguistic churches which follow uniformly the liturgical, doctrinal, and disciplinary prescriptions of the Eastern or Greek tradition of the Christian faith. The many national churches together comprising the Eastern Orthodox or Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, are without formal organizational structure save in regional national units. One should hasten to add, however, that this lack of formal or structural organization by no means implies any lack of strict requirements for valid membership within the whole Orthodox Church. Only Churches or hierarchies which adhere strictly to the uniform doctrine, liturgical usages, and church law and canons of Orthodoxy, and which, moreover, have derived their organizational existence and sacramental authority in legal manner from recognized Orthodox Churches, are accounted as valid canonical members of the brotherhood of Orthodox Churches and hierarchies. A communicant of any one of these is eligible for all sacramental ministrations in all Orthodox Churches, but he may not go outside of any of them to receive sacramental ministrations from any non-Orthodox church. Likewise a member or communicant of any church not recognized as lawfully Orthodox may not receive Orthodox sacramental ministrations. It is this strict adherence to rigid membership standards which has preserved the purity, unity, and strength of the Orthodox faith and Church.

For the devout Orthodox, however, religion is not merely doctrine or church discipline; it is essentially a pervading spirit and attitude. It colors and affects the nature of all action and thought. It is not possible to follow Orthodoxy merely as sentimentalism or aesthetics or an intellectual or moral formalism. Like the nature of his Church, the nature of an Orthodox believer's personal religion is spiritual rather than formally structural or legalistic. He cannot possibly prevent religion affecting his business, his economic, political and social thinking, in short, his life in its every phase and activity. A realization of this essentially pervasive rather than legalistic nature of the Russian Orthodox religion is fundamental to an understanding of its position and influence in the Soviet Union. Since religion is not merely the Church as an organization, or church-going as a habit, and so cannot be really separated from the everyday life of the people, separation of Church and State is a technical and formal academic concept having little reality in life.

Russia as a nation was virtually created by the Orthodox Church. The language was de-

vised by her missionaries. The cultural, artistic, and musical traditions as well as the religious traditions were transferred to the north from the Graeco-Byzantine Empire in its fullest flower. The welding of countless tribes into one civilized nation with one spiritual culture was the work of the Orthodox Church. For centuries the influence of the Church leaders was greater than that of princes or civil authorities, since these latter arose only gradually to wide power.

Under Peter the Great the Church organization finally was subjected to dominance by the Czar and became, from the political aspect, a bureau of the government. Religiously and doctrinally it preserved its complete independence and identity, but its alliance with the state was definitely one of subservience to civil authority in matters of social organization and control. The formerly independent and elected Patriarch was replaced as head of the national Church by a Synod under control of the Czar's lay appointee, the "Oberprocuror," whose approval was required for all decisions, elections, or appointments.

During two hundred years of this regime the Church organization, in the minds of many of its clergy and people, came to be identified with and dependent upon the Czar. Many erroneously considered the Czar the head of the Church, but this was never true in fact. Many of the Russian clergy, however, thought of the Czar as essential to the Church organization and position, and lost all conception of the Church as distinct from the Czarist state.

Unquestionably the spiritual influence and power of the Church—the vitality and reality of the Christian religion in many of its clergy and in the masses of its technical believers—steadily declined during the period of dependence on the Czar. The true nature of Orthodoxy was more and more submerged under a flood of wealth, material power and position, and easy inertia which sapped vitality and stifled spiritual life and growth. The real life of religion was hidden under a glittering brittle exterior shell which was too often mistaken for the Church itself.

But throughout all the generations of decadent dependence on the Czar the teaching of Orthodoxy went on with its inevitable emphasis on spirit and on the common brotherhood of all men—peasants and princes alike. Irresistibly this teaching was producing the groundwork of revolution against the very political and social regime on which the Church seemed to be dependent. True Christianity is essentially incompatible with any social, political, or economic systems which fail to preserve and enhance the dignity and well-being of all men equally as brothers. Apparently only on the surface, and there only temporarily, can the Orthodox tradition be made to support anything less than the Kingdom of God on earth in the cooperative brotherhood of all men. In this sense Christianity is always, unconsciously perhaps but no less truly, revolutionary by its very nature.

When, at the disastrous close of the First World War, the Czar's government fell, quickly followed by the fall of the Kerensky regime and the rise of the Revolution to permanent supreme power in Russia, the Russian Church was in process of reorganization on its former independent basis with an elected Patriarch at its head. Fundamentally, the principles of the Church were in accord with the broad principle of a cooperative society dedicated to common welfare without privileged classes. But superficially the Church organization was at one with the Czarist regime, and at one also, as appearances seemed to imply, with all that that regime represented. Conflict, both within the Church and between the Church and the new regime, could not be long delayed nor quickly healed.

During the years immediately following the Revolution, probably most of the Russian bishops and clergy expected and hoped for a quick return of the Czarist regime. Many of them more or less secretly favored and supported schemes designed to overthrow the Soviet state. Naturally many were tried, and in some cases were executed or imprisoned on charges of political treason. Doubtless the real issue was political rather than religious; but always such cases were accounted, at least outside Russia, as mere anti-religious persecution. General antagonism to the Soviet state was thereby fostered and promoted. At the same time the political activities of many of the clergy, and the Czarist reputation of the Church, greatly increased the tendency, common to all revolutions, to be anti-religious or at least anti-clerical. Divisions appeared within the Church and rival hierarchies were set up. The entire situation was confused and uncertain.

In 1919 Patriarch Tikhon and the group loyal to him recognized that the Soviet State was likely to be permanent, and was representative of the will and desires of the mass of Russian people; and that, furthermore, its work was promoting common welfare and cooperation and need not necessarily be anti-religious if only the Church and clergy refrained from political activity and propaganda. The Soviet State at the same time was persuaded that the Church was not essentially opposed to the basic principles of the Revolution. Accordingly, a concordat of mutual neutrality was arranged between Church and State; and the Church, through Patriarch Tikhon and his successors in charge of the Patriarchate of Moscow and All-Russia, required that the clergy should abstain from all political activities, and should be loyal to the Patriarchate as the supreme Russian Church authority.

Following this Concordat the Church set up a relatively stable central administration, reopened many closed churches, published the official Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, reorganized its dioceses and bishoprics throughout the Soviet Union and in other countries, and gathered strength and followers among the mass of Russian people. Hoodlum interference with religious services and processions was restrained by civil authorities, and the excesses of the "Godless Societies" were curbed. At the same time the Church was coming to a deeper realization that its real life and strength lay, as always, in the faith and soul of the people rather than in any political regime. Church leaders, conscious of the Church's unity with the common welfare of all the people, recognized that the Soviet State was promoting material and educational welfare and was preparing the ground for ever-increasing cooperative social benefits. In 1936 the Soviet Constitution declared full freedom of religion, and extended all civic rights to clergy as to other occupations and professions. The Soviet State had found that the Russian Church could be free from politics and that religion was both inevitable and desirable as a part of the life and culture of the state and its people.

When the Nazi attack on Russia came, the Germans hoped and many others believed that the Church would welcome the opportunity to betray the State in order to overthrow the Soviet regime. The Church, on the contrary, at once rallied all its followers in loyal support of the Soviet army and Premier Stalin. Metropolitan Sergius, then Locum Tenens and now Patriarch of Moscow, together with his bishops and clergy, proved that the Church not only was loyal and faithful to the Russian people but that it was also the most powerful unifying force in Soviet civilian life. The Soviet State learned that the Church and religion was not necessarily "the opiate of the people," but could be the most potent stimulant to heroic defense, resistance, and attack.

This past year has presented the culmination of twenty years of steady re-birth and growth of the Church in the Soviet Union. A Council of Bishops was held in Moscow, and a Patriarch was elected in succession to Patriarch Tikhon, who died in 1924. Under His Holiness, Sergius, Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia, the Church resumes the normal structure of its independent organization. This takes place in an atmosphere of full mutual confidence, respect, and cooperation between Church and State for the common welfare of all the people, and the continued transmission, unimpaired, of their spiritual and religious heritage. The Moscow Theological Academy, with its full faculty, courses, and student body of young men preparing for the priesthood, is being reopened so that the continuity of trained Church personnel is assured.

For mutual discussion and collaboration in matters of joint concern the Soviet government has appointed a permanent commission to confer with the Patriarch and Holy Synod. It is assumed that education and educational publications, youth and relief organizations, and the rehabilitation of devastated invaded areas will be among the important matters of joint concern to Church and State. In this connection it may be noted that the Red Army engineers are assisting in rebuilding churches damaged by the German invaders; that Metropolitan Nicholai of Kief, chief assistant to Patriarch Sergius, is a member of the Soviet Government Commission to investigate and report on Nazi atrocities in the occupied areas; that Archbishop Luke is head of a Red Army hospital; and that the Soviet authorities are genuinely assisting in the complete restitution of the Church to its rightful position in Russian life. Mutual cooperation between the Soviet State and the Russian Church is a reality vital to both, not a mere polite phrase.

Some have questioned if religion in Russia was not just a survival among the aged—if it really existed in the children and among the post-Revolution generation. On this we may quote the Archbishop of York in reporting his recent visit to Moscow: "Any contention that it is only old people who go to church in Russia is sheer nonsense." It is a notable fact that the number of young Red Army soldiers crossing themselves in prayer before going into battle, and wearing crosses with their identification tags, has moved Moscow newspapers to the warning that religious faith should not be ridiculed. American newspaper correspondents have commented on the number of young people and the scattering of Red Army men present at religious services. Patriarch Sergius and the clergy have testified to a mighty religious upsurge and revival among all the people. Undoubtedly, religion is today a powerful force in the life of all ages in the Soviet Union.

What is the position of religions other than the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union? In answering this question one must distinguish between those religions which may be considered *native* to the Soviet peoples—such as the Orthodox, the Armenian, the Jewish, and the Mohammedan—and those which may be counted *foreign.* The clergy of the former, being generally Soviet citizens, would have all the status and rights of citizens and would have the confidence of both people and government. Clergy of the latter, however, being generally foreigners, would not have the same status or rights, and (especially in wartime) might be viewed with suspicion. In regard to foreign missions in the Soviet Union, it might be considered also that in these times national unity and solidarity is a prime desideratum. While Orthodoxy historically has been, and has proved itself presently to be, actually a unifying force in Russia, it may well be believed that the missions of proselytizing churches from the outside would contribute nothing to national unity.

If Orthodoxy seems to have a more favored position in the Soviet Union than Roman Catholicism or any variety of Protestant mission, this is likely to be from strictly practical rather than theoretical considerations. In general we may be confident that the Soviet constitutional guarantee of full freedom of religion to all its citizens means what it says and is being observed. It is certain that religion today is a more deeply vital force in Russian life than it was thirty years ago.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE PACIFIC

By IVAR SPECTOR, *Associate Professor of Russian Language and Literature, Far Eastern Department, University of Washington*

The need for a better understanding of Soviet foreign policy, especially with regard to the Pacific, is imperative as far as the United States and, in particular, the Pacific Northwest are concerned. Strange as it may seem, with few exceptions, our numerous books and periodicals about the Far East still concentrate on China and Japan, and completely overlook Russia as a Pacific power. In other words, there is as yet no up-to-date definition of the Pacific.

The Soviet Union, as a Pacific power, is, therefore, a brand-new subject to the Western world. It is only today that Americans have begun to realize the importance of studying Soviet Asia. The reason they, like Churchill, have found the Soviet Union to be "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" is simply that they have approached it with Western glasses from the strictly economic point of view, instead of using strategy as the key to the riddle. The recent lamentable failure of our experts to estimate the strength of the U.S.S.R. may likewise be attributed to the same Western approach. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union can best be understood through her foreign policy, it is the purpose of this article to survey that policy, especially as it concerns the Pacific and the American Pacific Northwest.

Highlights of Soviet Foreign Policy. Since 1917 Soviet foreign policy has passed through many phases. During the first period, from 1917 to 1928, the U.S.S.R. stood for world revolution. The Third International (Comintern), established in 1919, and officially dissolved in 1943, although it has been more or less in the background since 1928, had a two-fold purpose—aggressive and defensive. The extreme internationalists, the aggressive element, concentrated upon fomenting world revolution. More moderate revolutionists, interested in defense as an aftermath of Allied intervention in Russia (1918-1922), hoped by means of the Comintern activities abroad to keep capitalist countries so busy with their own affairs that they would have no time or opportunity to intervene in Russia. As Litvinov, in a statement to the Associated Press, January 21, 1919, explained, Russian propaganda "was an act of self-defense."[1] This is well illustrated by Soviet-Japanese relations. In 1924, on the eve of the resumption of treaty relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan (1925), Soviet Russia dissolved the Comintern in Japan. Only later, when the Japanese threat to Russia became acute, was it revived.

During the second period, from 1928 to 1934, Soviet leaders made non-aggression pacts with neighboring states, and sought recognition for the Soviet Union, particularly from the United States (1933). The reason for this shift in policy from world revolution to one of nationalist orientation is obvious. Trotsky, the chief exponent of internationalism and world revolution, was expelled from the Union (1927), and was replaced by Stalin, the nationalist, who, with the inauguration of the first Five-Year Plan (1928-1932), focussed his efforts upon a program of building Socialism in one country—the U.S.S.R. To do this successfully, Russia needed peace and security. However, the non-aggression pacts, which met Soviet needs, were equally advantageous to Russia's weak and insecure neighbors.

From the United States, Soviet Russia sought recognition, not only to secure moral support, but to get machinery and technical assistance for the successful completion of the Soviet program of heavy industry. That our recognition of the Soviet Union on November 16, 1933, was of mutual advantage to both countries concerned may be recognized by the fact that it sufficed to postpone Japanese plans for aggression against Asiatic Russia, at a time when the U.S.S.R. was ill-prepared to resist. Had Japanese designs not been thwarted, it is highly probable that Japan would have seized not only the Maritime

[1] A. U. Pope, *Maxim Litvinoff,* p. 153.

Province of Siberia, but the entire Soviet Far East to the Bering Straits, and might have begun this conflict against America from the vantage point of Siberian bases thirty-nine miles from Alaska.

In the third period, 1934 to 1938, Soviet Russia stood for collective security within the framework of the League of Nations. During these years, the U.S.S.R. was threatened by the rise of Hitler to power in the West, and by Japanese expansion in the Far East. Soviet leaders managed to obtain a defensive alliance with France, and a pact with Czechoslovakia, which promised Soviet military aid to the Czechs if and when France fulfilled her pledge to come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia. Soviet efforts in the direction of collective security foundered on the shoals of Munich. The French Alliance and the Czech Pact were likewise automatically annulled by the Munich deal of 1938, and Russia stood alone in Europe as well as in Asia.

From September, 1938, to August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union made a final bid for collective security against Nazi Germany. Immediately following the German occupation of Prague in March, 1939, Litvinov called for an international conference of all nations opposed to aggression, but Chamberlain rejected the proposal as "premature." In April, however, mainly at French insistence, Anglo-French representatives went to Moscow, ostensibly to negotiate an agreement designed to stop Hitler.

Soviet leaders, with some reason, doubted the sincerity of the Anglo-French Governments in their dealings with the U.S.S.R. The undue procrastination and hesitation of the two Western democracies, together with the revelation simultaneously of English schemes to advance a loan of £1,000,000,000 to Nazi Germany,[2] induced the Russians to take direct action in the interests of their own immediate security.

Following the previous example of Britain (September 30, 1938) and France (December 6, 1938), Russia then, to the consternation and dismay of the Western democracies, entered into a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany on August 23, 1939. Contrary to popular opinion, this was not an alliance, but a non-aggression pact, similar in scope to those already concluded by Britain and France with Germany.

By their appeasement of Hitler at Munich, the British and French governments had hoped to deflect Hitlerite aggression, if they could not prevent it entirely, to the east against Russia, and thereby save themselves. The Soviet-German non-aggression pact forestalled any such program. Actually, as events unfolded, it produced the opposite results, making Britain and France rather than Russia the immediate victims of Nazi expansionism.

Had Hitler invaded the Soviet Union first, there seems little reason to doubt that English and French political leaders would have applauded the move, and, congratulating one another on the results of their astute diplomacy, they might even have provided the Germans with financial aid. When, following the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Hitler promptly invaded Poland, thereby forcing England and France reluctantly into the war, the Western democracies accused the U.S.S.R. of doublecrossing them by giving the Nazis "the green light" in the west. There seems to be no adequate proof, however, that Hitler or Stalin expected England and France to rush to the aid of Poland any more than they had gone to the rescue of Czechoslovakia. Prejudice rather than objectivity still colors the interpretation of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. From the standpoint of Soviet strategy, it gave the Russians a breathing spell in which to prepare for the coming conflict, and it prevented any immediate Nazi invasion of the U.S.S.R., with the tacit support of England and France.

Finally, from the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, to the Nazi invasion of the U. S. S. R. on June 22, 1941, Soviet leaders pursued an independent foreign policy. This should be emphasized because there have been so many misstatements to the effect that, with the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Stalin became a tool of Hitler. Hitler's tool could never have occupied Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, half of Poland, and the Baltic states of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, not to mention advanced bases in Finland—all at Hitler's expense.

In summing up Soviet foreign policy, we may safely conclude that during the years fol-

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[2] See especially *New York Times,* July 21-25, 1939; David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942* (Yale University Press, 1942), pp. 47-48; Frederick L. Schuman, *Night Over Europe* (Knopf, 1941), p. 204.

lowing the Revolution of 1917 Soviet leaders, still smarting from the Intervention (1918-1922), assumed that the U.S.S.R. stood alone against the world, and that all foreign agreements were directed against her. Their reaction to the Washington Conference (1921-1922),[3] to which the Soviets were not invited, was the Rapallo Agreement of 1922 with Germany and the Treaty of Friendship and Recognition with Japan in 1925. In response to the Locarno Agreement of 1925, the Russians made a series of non-aggression pacts with their neighbors. To offset the Anglo-French non-aggression pacts with Germany after Munich, the Russians entered into a similar pact of their own with the Nazis, followed by a five-year neutrality pact with Japan in the Pacific (1941). In other words, when the great powers proceeded to isolate and ignore the Soviet Union, Soviet leaders took parallel action in the interests of Soviet security.

In the light of events it has become clear that whether they sought the collaboration of Britain and France, recognition by the United States, or signed non-aggression or neutrality agreements with Germany and Japan respectively, the Russians were concerned first and always with the problem of making the U.S.S.R. strategically strong and secure. As Stalin himself stated so clearly and vigorously on the eve of the Soviet reforms of 1935: "We never had any orientation toward Germany, nor have we any orientation toward Poland and France. Our orientation in the past and our orientation in the present is toward the U.S.S.R., and toward the U.S.S.R. alone."

Soviet Foreign Policy in the Pacific. With regard to the Far East, during the period in question, Soviet leaders followed the Czarist tradition to this extent, that when Russia was threatened both from the east and from the west, they subordinated Russian interests in the east to those of the west. Thus Soviet Russia subordinated her Far Eastern policy to the European, and even made concessions to the Japanese in the belief that the threat from the west (Hitler) was of greater consequence. After the Japanese entry into Manchuria in 1931, however, the Soviet Government made provision for the rapid colonization and industrialization of Siberia. This served the twofold purpose of deterring the Japanese from their designs against Siberia, and of providing an arsenal and training ground for the U.S.S.R. in the conflict with Germany.

Since the Western powers, for ideological considerations, pursued, in the Far East as in Europe, the policy of isolating and ignoring the Soviet Union, even going so far as to exert pressure upon China to do the same (1927), it was but natural that the Russians should find it expedient to take parallel action in the interests of Soviet security by coming to terms with Japan in Asia as they did with Germany in Europe. Japan, having emerged from the last great conflict (1914-1918) as the strongest power in eastern Asia, only to be thwarted in her designs of further aggrandizement by the Western powers, particularly by the United States, likewise found it advantageous to come to an understanding with the U.S.S.R. It is significant that the initiative in the direction of better Soviet-Japanese relations ordinarily came from the Japanese rather than from the Russians.

Soviet-Chinese Relations. After the Russo-Japanese War, the Czarist government, as substantiated by the Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907 and 1916,[4] saw eye to eye with Japan regarding the partition of China. The Soviet regime, on the other hand, wanted a strong and friendly China, and an alliance with America in the Pacific at the expense of Japan. Beginning with Lenin (Seventh Congress of Bolsheviks, 1918), Soviet leaders regarded Japan as the greatest threat, not only to Russia, but to the world at large. In this connection, it is significant that one of the early Soviet leaders, Karl Radek, writing in *Pravda* as early as September 28, 1922, argued in favor of a Soviet-American alliance in the Pacific, because he believed that the fleets of Britain and the United States could never inflict a decisive blow against the Japanese, on account of Japan's defensive position. He likewise tried to convince Americans that it was to their interest to support the new nationalist movement in China, with the objective of creating a strong China to offset Japan.

By sending Joffe, Borodin, and Blucher to China, Soviet leaders did not intend to, nor

[3] See *Japanese Intervention in the Russian Far East* (Washington, D. C., Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the U. S. A., 1922). See also H. K. Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia.*

[4] See B. Nikolayevsky, "Sovieto-Yaponskia Otnoshenia," *Novii Zhurnal,* vol. V, 1943.

did they believe that they could, execute there a revolution of the 1917 vintage. They did hope to achieve a revolution like that of 1905 in Russia. They therefore appealed to Chinese national pride in China's rich and ancient cultural heritage, and to the need for Chinese national unity and independence—a procedure which the Comintern did not adopt in any other country, not even in Soviet Russia at that time, for the Soviets ordinarily emphasized social and economic exploitation on a class basis, to the exclusion of other factors.

The Soviet justification for interference in China was Soviet interest in creating a strong and friendly China to offset Japan in the Pacific, in the belief that if the Russians did not establish their influence there, the Japanese would. In this respect, Soviet leaders were correct. In other words, the Soviets were in the Pacific, as in Europe, motivated by strategy rather than by economics, in spite of Marx.

Russo-Chinese relations, however, have been overshadowed by the rise of an aggressive Japan, particularly since 1931. Yet the Russians, even after the conflict between China and Japan began in 1937, supplied the Chinese with more than sixty per cent of the aid they received from abroad, at a time when England and America, still in doubt as to whether the creation of a strong China was to their own interest, sent scrap iron and oil to Japan. In view of the hostility and suspicion of the Western democracies toward Soviet Russia, it seems apparent, in retrospect, that they sent aid to Japan because Russia was helping China. Prominent Chinese visiting America have been so conscious of the opposition to Russia here that, although they have publicly acknowledged American aid, they have carefully avoided all public recognition of Soviet help. It is possible that the recent removal of Soviet-built factories and oil refineries in Sinkiang Province, and the large-scale withdrawal of Russians from that region, may forecast a new Soviet policy toward China.

Czarist Relations with Japan. To understand Soviet-Japanese relations, it is necessary by way of recapitulation to turn back to the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1907, which was supplemented by the two additional treaties of 1910 and 1912. These treaties were the first step in the direction of a Russo-Japanese alliance aimed at the Western powers, in particular against America. They indicated the reorientation of Russo-Japanese policy following the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905.

In spite of their recent triumph over Russia, the Japanese, dissatisfied with the attitude of the Western powers toward the emergence of a strong Japan, took the initiative in an effort to appease the Czarist regime. The Russian government, in spite of Theodore Roosevelt's efforts at Portsmouth to ameliorate the peace terms demanded by Japan, resented Western sympathy for Japan and what they regarded as Western efforts to foment revolution inside the Czarist realm during the conflict. For the Russians believed that they lost the war chiefly because of internal revolution, rather than because of Japanese military and naval prowess. Japan and Russia, after 1907, were therefore brought together by their mutual distrust of the Western democracies.

The next step was taken in 1916 when Japan, in bitter resentment over American protests against the Twenty-One Demands on China (1915), again took the initiative to secure from Czarist Russia a secret treaty, aimed against any "third power" which might seek to establish a protectorate over China.[5] The "third power" was America. It is now obvious that Japan, far from content with the prospect of securing the former German colonies in the Pacific, was making elaborate preparations for further expansion in Asia with the tacit consent of the Czarist regime, which expected to share the spoils. The Revolution of 1917, however, thwarted Japanese designs, and forced them to postpone their program indefinitely, although they did not yield without a struggle.

When the Japanese occupied Eastern Siberia (1918-1922), during the Allied Intervention in Russia, they were able to convince many Russians that their purpose was to restore the Czarist regime and to revive the Treaty of 1916. As late as 1919 Purishkevitch, a former monarchist deputy of the Duma, and one of the chief propagandists of the Kolchak-Denikin regime, openly advocated the establishment of a kind of "Dreikaiserbund," including Germany, Russia, and Japan, as the best guarantee for the maintenance of world peace, and as a bulwark against democracy and communism.

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[5] Nikolayevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-240.

Soviet-Japanese Relations. When the Washington Conference (1921-1922), which ignored Soviet Russia, likewise aroused the bitter resentent of Japan by denying her naval equality with Britain and the United States and forcing her to withdraw from Siberia, the way was again paved for a Russo-Japanese rapprochement. The Treaty of Friendship and Recognition between the U.S.S.R. and Japan in 1925 was reminiscent, in some respects, of the treaty between Czarist Russia and Japan in 1916. This agreement not only guaranteed the "neutrality" of the U.S.S.R. in the event of a conflict between Japan and a third power, but likewise promised delivery of oil to the Japanese fleet during such a conflict. Russia was again taking parallel action.

Three years later, in 1928, after the Nanking government had broken off diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. (1927), ostensibly because of Comintern activity, but actually because of Anglo-American pressure upon the Kuomintang, the Russians proceeded to renew their 1907 Fisheries Agreement with Japan. The fisheries deal, which expired in 1936, has been renewed annually since that time, with progressive modifications in favor of Soviet Russia. On March 30, 1944, when the agreement was renewed for a period of five years, the Japanese, in addition to the surrender of certain fishing lanes of strategic importance to the Soviet Union, likewise agreed to the termination of Japanese coal and oil concessions in northern Sakhalin, granted to Japan in 1925 for a 45-year term, and which still had 26 years to run.

Until the Japanese occupied Manchuria in 1931, relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan continued for the most part in accordance with the Treaty of 1925. The aggressive militarists in Japan, however, perhaps encouraged by the White Russian elements in Manchuria, began to believe that they could occupy Outer Mongolia and Eastern Siberia as easily as they had Manchuria. They likewise suspected the existence of a secret Sino-Soviet pact when the Chinese Nanking Government restored diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. in 1932.

Following the Japanese refusal to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1932, border skirmishes increased along the Manchurian and Outer Mongolian borders, and Japanese pressure forced the Russians to retire from competition in Manchuria (Manchukuo), even to the extent of selling their interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway (1935). Because of the growing menace of Hitler in the west, Soviet leaders preferred to avoid conflict with the Japanese, although they refused to sacrifice the Mongolian People's Republic in order to do so—as the Western democracies sacrificed Czechoslovakia. Japanese adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 still further threatened the Russians with the possibility of a war on two fronts—a situation they were determined to avoid.

By the time the Japanese, emboldened by their initial successes, attacked the Red Army in force at Changkufeng (Hasan) on the Manchukuan frontier in 1938, and again at Nomonhan on the Mongolian frontier in 1939, the Soviet forces were ready for them, and inflicted a decisive defeat upon the Japanese in each case. Having incurred 42,000 casualties, including 18,000 killed at Nomonhan, the Japanese abandoned any intentions they may have had of immediate aggression against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939, profoundly shocked the Japanese. They soon made an opportunity, however, in conjunction with Matsuoka's trip to Berlin, to follow the German example, and concluded a five-year neutrality pact with Soviet Russia on April 13, 1941. Unlike the Western democracies, the Japanese did not anticipate a successful Nazi blitzkrieg against the U.S.S.R., following the German invasion of Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941. Japan had already discovered the strength of the Red Army in the Far East.

Just as the Soviet-German non-aggression pact deflected Nazi aggression, for the time being, from the U.S.S.R. toward the Western democracies, so the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact served to deflect Japanese aggression from the direction of Siberia to the possessions of the Western democracies in the South Pacific. However, just as Hitler did not dare to move against the Soviet Union until he had subdued the rest of the continent of Europe, Japan did not risk moving south until the Nazis had invaded the Soviet Union and the fall of Moscow seemed imminent.

Actually, as far as the U.S.S.R. and Japan are concerned, each has been relieved to find the other involved in a life and death conflict

at this critical time. Under present circumstances, neither country seems disposed to break the neutrality pact of 1941, which is operating to their mutual advantage.

Soviet-American Relations. In the past, Americans and Russians have had no occasion to fear one another in the Pacific. As communications were, in former years, each seemed far from the other. Indeed, Soviet Russia has been concentrating on the population, industrialization, and defense of Eastern Siberia only for some twelve years, since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Strictly speaking, Americans discovered the strategic importance of Alaska within the past two and a half years, with the development of air transportation and the threat of Japanese aggression. Today the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are, therefore, becoming more and more conscious of their proximity in the Pacific.

Ever since Pearl Harbor, many Americans, in their anxiety to inflict a decisive blow upon Japan with a minimum loss of American life, have speculated about the advantages to us of the use of the Siberian bases of Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk, etc. It has even been suggested, on more than one occasion, that if the Russians will not lend us these bases, or sell them to us, we should just go ahead and take them. Irrespective of the origin of such demands—and they have come from sundry American senators, publishers, radio commentators and clergymen—or of the motives behind them, they are likely to produce results such as we have not yet anticipated. It is not too much to expect that American demands for Siberian bases, which have been widely publicized throughout the United States, may lead to a reorientation of Soviet foreign policy in the Pacific, particularly with reference to the United States.

Incidentally, the Americans who expect the U.S.S.R. to hand over Siberian bases today are often the very ones who opposed any understanding with Russia in the Pacific prior to Pearl Harbor, in the belief that Japan would attack the Soviet Union rather than the United States. These same Americans, if present circumstances were reversed, would probably be the first to oppose Soviet use of American bases in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest.

While it is true that most Americans visualize only the temporary occupation of Siberian bases, the Russians, always suspicious of designs which threaten the territorial security of the Soviet Union, are almost sure to regard our recent interest in these bases as a manifestation of American imperialism. Some Americans are already demanding that we keep bases acquired in other parts of the world on which so much American money and effort have been expended. To the Russians, this suggests that we would likewise seek to keep Siberian bases, or at the very least, that we would expect to re-occupy them in the future whenever any major disturbance threatened the status quo in the Pacific.

The net result, so far as the Russians are concerned, would amount to the establishment of a string of American bases along the Siberian coast, cutting off the Russians from the Pacific, as the small Baltic outposts have obstructed Russia's window on the Baltic Sea. But, in this case, the bases would be the avant-posts of a mighty nation, instead of a series of small, independent Baltic republics, which are merely the stepping stones for a powerful German invader.

It stands to reason that Soviet leaders would never, of their own volition, permit such a situation to develop in the Pacific, any more than we would allow them to take over bases in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. If they should become convinced that America has designs on the Siberian bases, however, they are sure to adopt strategic measures for their protection, such as the acquisition of additional Soviet outposts, a renewed interest in Alaska and the Aleutians, and closer relations with Japan. In other words, the Russians would, as always when their security is threatened, take parallel action.

If we continue to arouse Soviet suspicions by asserting claims to Siberian bases and the Russians seek new outposts in order to provide security for those they already possess, we shall soon find that the recently discovered proximity of America and the Soviet Union, instead of affording mutually beneficial opportunities for an expanding trade and commerce, will become a curse, and the two nations will have to maintain an elaborate defense system and huge armies in the North Pacific to check one another.

The impression may be created that those who demand Siberian bases are patriots, who seek only to save American lives, while those

who warn against such demands are not. Unfortunately, the "patriots" have been abetted by anti-Russian, pro-Nazi sympathizers, whose chief concern is to confuse the issues, and to promote the estrangement of the two Pacific powers. And the "patriots" themselves are apparently ignorant of the damage they will do.

An educator must interpret a country as it is, not as he would like it to be. For the last 25 years too many Americans pursued the latter method, with the result that when the crisis came, we had no authority in power correctly informed as to the real facts of the strength of Russia and Japan. If we could continue to demand Siberian bases without injury to Soviet-American relations, there would be no need to give the matter a second thought. But anyone who knows the Russian people, their character, temperament, and strategy, is well aware that these recurring demands for the use of Siberian bases will seriously obstruct a better understanding between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the Pacific.

While an occasional American Congressman has been able to make irresponsible statements about the annexation of Canada without any more serious repercussions than a few stormy editorials in the Canadian press, similar threats as regards Russian bases are likely to transform the North Pacific into an armed camp. The U.S.A. stands in a different relation to the U.S.S.R. than it does to Canada. And whereas the population of the Canadian Dominion is something in excess of 11,000,000, it seems highly probable that at least one-half of the population of the Soviet Union, around 100,000,000, will remain permanently in Asiatic Russia.

We Americans have become accustomed, in this hemisphere, to neighbors who are much weaker, militarily and economically, than we are, and who regard the United States as a kind of a colossus to be appeased rather than defied. But the neighbor we have just discovered 39 miles from Alaska is emerging from this war as one of the strongest military powers in the world. The U.S.S.R. is as much a colossus to the rest of her neighbors as we are to ours. We cannot assume "leadership" over these Russians nor dictate to them the policy they must adopt any more than we would tolerate such action on their part. In the absence of conflicting territorial claims, we can collaborate with them and trade with them to the mutual advantage of both nations. As Cordell Hull stated on November 16, 1943, upon his return from the Moscow Conference, there are no two nations that have as many interests in common economically as the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

The Pacific Northwest. The American states of the Pacific Northwest and Canada, because they stand to gain immeasurably by improved relations with the Soviet Union, and would suffer most if the Pacific coast were transformed permanently into a vast military barracks, should therefore take the lead now in emphasizing the importance of a better understanding, while there is time, among the U.S.A., Canada, and the U.S.S.R.

For the Dominion of Canada the failure of either Britain or the United States to reach an understanding with the U.S.S.R. would be particularly serious. For in the event of a clash between Britain and Russia, or between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the Canadian northland would inevitably be laid open to invasion.

Though our main interest, particularly in the Northwest, is for increased trade and better economic relations with Soviet Russia, our economists and business men will need to be sure that they do not include under economic items, many of which the Soviets regard from the standpoint of strategy rather than of economy. To us landing and refueling rights in Yakutia may seem to be of economic concern only, but the Russians may regard them as strategic. Above all, our business men should not approach the U.S.S.R. as Westerners have approached and still do approach China and India—with "colonial minds," and an assumption of "leadership." Instead of leadership, the Russians expect collaboration on a basis of equality, and nothing less will succeed. The Moscow and the Teheran Conferences were undoubtedly an important step in that direction.

Conclusion. We must bear in mind that the Soviet Union, now that Siberia is no longer just a hinterland, has more at stake in the Far East than all the Allied nations together, with the exception of China. With the defeat of Japan, moreover, the Soviet Union will emerge the strongest power on the Asiatic mainland, both from the military and the economic standpoint. While China, as far as

manpower is concerned, may be potentially stronger, the U.S.S.R. will actually, for some years to come, be the foremost nation in eastern Asia. Soviet policy in the Pacific is therefore likely to become more positive, more stable, and more complex than it has been in the past. Soviet leaders will want to be sure that Russia's neighbors are neither hostile nor aggressive. They will have to take cognizance, not only of China and Japan, but also of America, Canada, and particularly of the Pacific Northwest.

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